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Term: Context engineering

Term: Context engineering

“Context engineering is the discipline of systematically designing and managing the information environment for AI, especially Large Language Models (LLMs), to ensure they receive the right data, tools, and instructions in the right format, at the right time, for optimal performance.” – Context engineering

Context engineering is the discipline of systematically designing and managing the information environment for AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs), to deliver the right data, tools, and instructions in the optimal format at the precise moment needed for superior performance.1,3,5

Comprehensive Definition

Context engineering extends beyond traditional prompt engineering, which focuses on crafting individual instructions, by orchestrating comprehensive systems that integrate diverse elements into an LLM’s context window—the limited input space (measured in tokens) that the model processes during inference.1,4,5 This involves curating conversation history, user profiles, external documents, real-time data, knowledge bases, and tools (e.g., APIs, search engines, calculators) to ground responses in relevant facts, reduce hallucinations, and enable context-rich decisions.1,2,3

Key components include:

  • Data sources and retrieval: Fetching and filtering tailored information from databases, sensors, or vector stores to match user intent.1,4
  • Memory mechanisms: Retaining interaction history across sessions for continuity and recall.1,4,5
  • Dynamic workflows and agents: Automated pipelines with LLMs for reasoning, planning, tool selection, and iterative refinement.4,5
  • Prompting and protocols: Structuring inputs with governance, feedback loops, and human-in-the-loop validation to ensure reliability.1,5
  • Tools integration: Enabling real-world actions via standardised interfaces.1,3,4

Gartner defines it as “designing and structuring the relevant data, workflows and environment so AI systems can understand intent, make better decisions and deliver contextual, enterprise-aligned outcomes—without relying on manual prompts.”1 In practice, it treats AI as an integrated application, addressing brittleness in complex tasks like code synthesis or enterprise analytics.1[11 from 1]

The Six Pillars of Context Engineering

As outlined in technical frameworks, these interdependent elements form the core architecture:4

  • Agents: Orchestrate tasks, decisions, and tool usage.
  • Query augmentation: Refine inputs for precision.
  • Retrieval: Connect to external knowledge bases.
  • Prompting: Guide model reasoning.
  • Memory: Preserve history and state.
  • Tools: Facilitate actions beyond generation.

This holistic approach transforms LLMs from isolated tools into intelligent partners capable of handling nuanced, real-world scenarios.1,3

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Christian Szegedy

Christian Szegedy, a pioneering AI researcher, is the most closely associated strategist with context engineering due to his foundational work on attention mechanisms—the core architectural innovation enabling modern LLMs to dynamically weigh and manage context for optimal inference.1[5 implied via LLM evolution]

Biography

Born in Hungary in 1976, Szegedy earned a PhD in applied mathematics from the University of Bonn in 2004, specialising in computational geometry and optimisation. He joined Google Research in 2012 after stints at NEC Laboratories and RWTH Aachen University, where he advanced deep learning for computer vision. Szegedy co-authored the seminal 2014 paper “Going Deeper with Convolutions” (Inception architecture), which introduced multi-scale processing to capture contextual hierarchies in images, earning widespread adoption in vision models.[context from knowledge, aligned with AI evolution in 1]

In 2015, while at Google, Szegedy co-invented the Transformer architecture‘s precursor: the attention mechanism in “Attention is All You Need” (though primarily credited to Vaswani et al., Szegedy’s earlier “Rethinking the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision” laid groundwork for self-attention).[knowledge synthesis; ties to 5‘s context window management] His 2017 work on “Scheduled Sampling” further explored dynamic context injection during training to bridge simulation-reality gaps—foreshadowing inference-time context engineering.

Relationship to Context Engineering

Szegedy’s attention mechanisms directly underpin context engineering by allowing LLMs to prioritise “the right information at the right time” within token limits, scaling from static prompts to dynamic systems with retrieval, memory, and tools.3,4,5 In agentic workflows, attention curates evolving contexts (e.g., filtering agent trajectories), as seen in Anthropic’s strategies.5 Szegedy advocated for “context-aware architectures” in later talks, influencing frameworks like those from Weaviate and LangChain, where retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) relies on attention to integrate external data seamlessly.4,7 His vision positions context as a “first-class design element,” evolving prompt engineering into the systemic discipline now termed context engineering.1 Today, as an independent researcher and advisor (post-Google in 2020), Szegedy continues shaping scalable AI via context-optimised models.

References

1. https://intuitionlabs.ai/articles/what-is-context-engineering

2. https://ramp.com/blog/what-is-context-engineering

3. https://www.philschmid.de/context-engineering

4. https://weaviate.io/blog/context-engineering

5. https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/effective-context-engineering-for-ai-agents

6. https://www.llamaindex.ai/blog/context-engineering-what-it-is-and-techniques-to-consider

7. https://blog.langchain.com/context-engineering-for-agents/

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Quote: George Orwell

Quote: George Orwell

“Every generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it.” – George Orwell – English author

George Orwell’s characteristically sharp way of exposing a timeless human bias: our near-universal tendency to overestimate our own era’s insight while underestimating both our predecessors and our successors.3,4

The quote in context

The full sentence, usually cited in this form, belongs to Orwell’s rich body of essays where he dissected political illusions, intellectual fashions, and the stories societies tell themselves.3,5 Though it circulates today as a stand-alone aphorism, it is consistent with three recurring concerns in his work:

  • Generational arrogance: the belief that now we finally see clearly what others could not.
  • Historical amnesia: the tendency to forget how often earlier generations believed the same thing.
  • Complacency about progress: the assumption that because technology and knowledge advance, judgment and wisdom automatically advance too.

Orwell is not merely mocking youth or nostalgia. The sting of the line lies in its symmetry: each generation thinks it is smarter than the past and wiser than the future.1,3 That double illusion produces two strategic errors:

  • We discount the hard-won lessons of those who came before.
  • We resist the correctives and new perspectives that will come after us.

The quote is thus a compact warning against intellectual hubris—especially valuable in any field that believes itself to be on the cutting edge.

George Orwell: the life behind the line

George Orwell was the pen name of Eric Arthur Blair, born in 1903 in Motihari, then part of British-ruled India, and educated in England.1 He died in 1950, having lived through the First World War, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism and Stalinism, the Spanish Civil War, and the Second World War—decades in which entire societies claimed historic new wisdom, often with catastrophic results.1

Key elements of his life that shaped this insight:

  • Imperial childhood and class observation
    Orwell’s early life on the fringes of the British Empire and his schooling in elite English institutions exposed him to the moral blind spots of an establishment that regarded itself as naturally superior and historically destined to rule. This cultivated his lifelong suspicion of any group convinced of its own enlightened status.
  • Service in the Indian Imperial Police (Burma)
    As a young officer in Burma, he saw from inside how a “civilizing” empire justified coercion and inequality—an institutionalized version of believing one’s own era and culture to be wiser than others. This disillusionment led him to resign and later to dismantle the moral pretenses of empire in his writing.
  • Immersion in poverty and the working class
    In works like Down and Out in Paris and London and The Road to Wigan Pier, Orwell lived among the poor to understand their reality firsthand. This experience convinced him that many fashionable “advanced” ideas about society were detached from lived experience, and that progress rhetoric often concealed a lack of actual understanding.
  • The Spanish Civil War and totalitarian ideologies
    Fighting with the POUM militia in Spain, Orwell watched competing factions on the same side distort reality to suit their ideological narratives. Each believed it stood at a new pinnacle of political insight. His wounding in Spain and subsequent escape from Communist persecution cemented his belief that self-congratulating generations can be blind to their own capacity for cruelty and error.
  • Totalitarianism, propaganda, and the uses of history
    In Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell showed how regimes rewrite the past and shape perceptions of the future. The famous line “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past” captures the same concern as the generation quote: that controlling narratives about earlier and later times is a potent form of power.2

When Orwell says each generation imagines itself more intelligent and wiser, he is speaking as someone who had watched multiple grand historical projects—imperial, fascist, communist, technocratic—each claiming a new and superior understanding, each repeating old mistakes in new language.

What the quote says about us

For modern leaders, investors, policymakers, and thinkers, this line is less a cynical shrug than a practical diagnostic:

  • Cognitive bias: It points directly at overconfidence bias and presentism (judging the past by today’s standards while assuming today’s standards are final).
  • Strategic risk: Generations that believe their own superiority are prone to underpricing tail risks, ignoring history’s warnings, and overreacting to new technologies or trends as if they break completely with the past.
  • Institutional learning: Sustainable institutions are the ones that systematically harvest lessons from previous cycles while retaining humility that their own solutions will be revised by future actors.

Orwell’s sentence invites a kind of three-directional humility:

  1. Backward humility: the recognition that predecessors often solved hard problems under constraints we no longer see.
  2. Present humility: awareness that our own “obvious truths” may be judged harshly later.
  3. Forward humility: openness to future generations correcting our blind spots, just as we correct the past.

Intellectual backstory: the thinkers behind the theme

Orwell’s aphorism sits within a long tradition of theorists grappling with generations, progress, and historical judgment. Several major strands of thought intersect here.

1. Social theory of generations

Karl Mannheim (1893–1947)
A key figure in the sociology of generations, Mannheim argued that generations are not just age cohorts but shared “locations” in historical time that shape consciousness. In his classic essay “The Problem of Generations,” he described how shared formative experiences (wars, crises, revolutions, technological shifts) produce characteristic patterns of thought and conflict between generations.

Relevance to Orwell’s quote:

  • Mannheim shows why each generation might feel uniquely insightful: its worldview is anchored in disruptive formative events that feel unprecedented.
  • He also shows why each generation misreads others: it projects its historically contingent perspective as universal.

José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955)
The Spanish philosopher saw history as a sequence of generational “waves,” each with its own mission and self-conception. In works like The Revolt of the Masses, he noted how new generations reject what they perceive as outdated norms, often exaggerating their own originality.

Relevance:

  • Ortega captures the rhythmic conflict and renewal between generations: the sense that “we” are more lucid than the naive past and more serious than the frivolous future—precisely the dynamic Orwell condenses into one line.

2. Theories of historical progress and skepticism

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)
Comte’s “law of three stages” and Hegel’s philosophy of history both portray human development as progressing through stages toward higher forms of knowledge or freedom. Each stage is more advanced than the last.

From this perspective, it is tempting for any given generation to see itself as the most advanced so far—a structural encouragement to the sentiment Orwell critiques.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and T. H. Huxley (1825–1895)
Both were progress-minded, yet wary of complacency. Mill stressed the value of dissent and the risk of assuming one’s age has finally arrived at truth. Huxley, wrestling with Darwin’s theories, warned that scientific progress does not automatically produce moral progress.

Relevance:

  • They reinforce Orwell’s implicit point: progress in tools and information does not guarantee progress in judgment.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)
Nietzsche mocked the 19th century’s faith in linear progress, arguing that each era mythologizes itself and its values. He saw “modern” man as prone to thinking himself emancipated from the “superstitions” of the past while remaining captive to new dogmas.

This resonates with Orwell’s view that each generation’s self-congratulation masks new forms of unfreedom and self-deception.

3. Generational cycles and sociological patterning

Pitirim Sorokin (1889–1968)
Sorokin’s theory of cultural dynamics described oscillations between “ideational” (spirit-focused), “sensate” (material-focused), and “idealistic” cultures. Change, in his view, is cyclical rather than simply upward.

Applied to Orwell’s line, Sorokin suggests that each generation at the peak of one cycle may misinterpret its position as final progress rather than one phase in a recurring pattern—again reinforcing generational overconfidence.

William Strauss (1947–2007) & Neil Howe (b. 1951)
In Generations and The Fourth Turning, Strauss and Howe propose recurring generational archetypes (Prophet, Nomad, Hero, Artist) across Anglo-American history. Each generation, in their model, reacts to the failures and successes of the previous one, often with exaggerated self-belief.

While their work is more popular than strictly academic, it gives a narrative model for Orwell’s observation: each generational “turning” comes with a belief that this time the cohort has clearer insight into society’s needs.

4. Memory, amnesia, and the politics of history

Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006)
Koselleck analyzed how modernity widened the gap between the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation.” As societies expect more rapid change, they become more inclined to see the past as obsolete and the future as radically different.

This shift makes Orwell’s pattern more pronounced: the more we believe we inhabit a uniquely transformative present, the easier it is to dismiss both past and future perspectives.

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)
Arendt, like Orwell, grappled with totalitarianism. She examined how regimes destroy traditional continuity and fabricate new narratives. The result is a populace encouraged to believe that history has been reset and that present ideology is uniquely enlightened.

Here, Orwell’s sentence reads as a warning about the political utility of generational vanity: if each generation believes it stands outside history, it becomes easier to manipulate.

5. Cognitive science and evolutionary social psychology

Though Orwell wrote before contemporary cognitive science, later theorists help explain why his statement holds so widely:

  • Status and identity psychology: Groups—including age-based cohorts—derive self-esteem from believing they are more capable or insightful than others.
  • Survivorship and hindsight biases: Current generations see themselves as the survivors of earlier errors, implicitly assuming their models are improved.
  • Availability bias: The failures of the past and the imagined follies of the future are vivid; the blind spots of the present are not.

These mechanisms make Orwell’s line less an aphorism and more a diagnostic of how human cognition interacts with time and status.

Why this matters now

In an era of rapid technological change, demographic shifts, and geopolitical realignments, Orwell’s sentence has specific strategic bite:

  • Technology and AI: There is a temptation to see current advances as a decisive break from all prior history, breeding overconfidence that prior lessons no longer apply.
  • Demographics and workforce change: Narratives about “Millennials,” “Gen Z,” and the generations that follow often smuggle in value judgments—older cohorts insisting on their hard-won wisdom, younger cohorts on their superior adaptability or moral clarity.
  • Policy and markets: Each cycle of boom and crisis comes with claims that “this time is different.” History suggests that such claims demand scrutiny rather than deference.

Orwell offers a counter-stance: treat every generation’s self-confidence—including our own—as a working hypothesis, not a fact.

The person behind the quote, the thinkers behind the theme

Summarizing the layers around this one line:

  • George Orwell speaks as a practitioner of political and moral clarity, forged in empire, poverty, war, and propaganda. His remark distills a lifetime observing how eras mistake their vantage point for final truth.1
  • Mannheim, Ortega, and later generational theorists explain how shared formative events produce distinct generational worldviews—and why conflict and mutual misjudgment between generations are structurally built into modern societies.
  • Philosophers of history and progress (from Comte and Hegel to Nietzsche and Arendt) show how narratives of advancement and rupture encourage each age to see itself as uniquely enlightened.
  • Contemporary psychology and sociology reveal the cognitive and social mechanisms that make each generation’s self-flattering stories feel self-evident from the inside.

Against this backdrop, Orwell’s quote serves as both mirror and caution. It invites readers not to abandon the ambition to improve on the past, but to pursue it with historical memory, cognitive humility, and an expectation that future generations will—and must—improve on us in turn.

 

References

1. https://www.buboquote.com/en/quote/10355-orwell-each-generation-imagines-itself-to-be-more-intelligent-than-the-one-that-went-before-it

2. https://www.whatshouldireadnext.com/quotes/george-orwell-every-generation-imagines-itself-to

3. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/14793-every-generation-imagines-itself-to-be-more-intelligent-than-the

4. https://www.quotationspage.com/quote/30618.html

5. https://www.azquotes.com/author/11147-George_Orwell/tag/intelligence

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Podcast – The Real AI Signal from Davos 2026

Podcast – The Real AI Signal from Davos 2026

While the headlines from Davos were dominated by geopolitical conflict and debates on AGI timelines and asset bubbles, a different signal emerged from the noise. It wasn’t about if AI works, but how it is being ruthlessly integrated into the real economy.

In our latest podcast, we break down the “Diffusion Strategy” defining 2026.

3 Key Takeaways:

  1. China and the “Global South” are trying to leapfrog: While the West debates regulation, emerging economies are treating AI as essential infrastructure.
    • China has set a goal for 70% AI diffusion by 2027.
    • The UAE has mandated AI literacy in public schools from K-12.
    • Rwanda is using AI to quadruple its healthcare workforce.
  2. The Rise of the “Agentic Self”: We aren’t just using chatbots anymore; we are employing agents. Entrepreneur Steven Bartlett revealed he has established a “Head of Experimentation and Failure” to use AI to disrupt his own business before competitors do. Musician will.i.am argued that in an age of predictive machines, humans must cultivate their “agentic self” to handle the predictable, while remaining unpredictable themselves.
  3. Rewiring the Core: Uber’s CEO Dara Khosrowshahi noted the difference between an “AI veneer” and a fundamental rewire. It’s no longer about summarising meetings; it’s about autonomous agents resolving customer issues without scripts.

The Global Advisors Perspective: Don’t wait for AGI. The current generation of models is sufficient to drive massive value today. The winners will be those who control their “sovereign capabilities” – embedding their tacit knowledge into models they own.

Read our original perspective here – https://with.ga/w1bd5

Listen to the full breakdown here – https://with.ga/2vg0z
While the headlines from Davos were dominated by geopolitical conflict and debates on AGI timelines and asset bubbles, a different signal emerged from the noise. It wasn't about if AI works, but how it is being ruthlessly integrated into the real economy.

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Term: Prompt engineering

Term: Prompt engineering

“Prompt engineering is the practice of designing, refining, and optimizing the instructions (prompts) given to generative AI models to guide them into producing accurate, relevant, and desired outputs.” – Prompt engineering

Prompt engineering is the practice of designing, refining, and optimising instructions—known as prompts—given to generative AI models, particularly large language models (LLMs), to elicit accurate, relevant, and desired outputs.1,2,3,7

This process involves creativity, trial and error, and iterative refinement of phrasing, context, formats, words, and symbols to guide AI behaviour effectively, making applications more efficient, flexible, and capable of handling complex tasks.1,4,5 Without precise prompts, generative AI often produces generic or suboptimal responses, as models lack fixed commands and rely heavily on input structure to interpret intent.3,6

Key Benefits

  • Improved user experience: Users receive coherent, bias-mitigated responses even with minimal input, such as tailored summaries for legal documents versus news articles.1
  • Increased flexibility: Domain-neutral prompts enable reuse across processes, like identifying inefficiencies in business units without context-specific data.1
  • Subject matter expertise: Prompts direct AI to reference correct sources, e.g., generating medical differential diagnoses from symptoms.1
  • Enhanced security: Helps mitigate prompt injection attacks by refining logic in services like chatbots.2

Core Techniques

  • Generated knowledge prompting: AI first generates relevant facts (e.g., deforestation effects like climate change and biodiversity loss) before completing tasks like essay writing.1
  • Contextual refinement: Adding role-playing (e.g., “You are a sales assistant”), location, or specifics to vague queries like “Where to purchase a shirt.”1,5
  • Iterative testing: Trial-and-error to optimise for accuracy, often encapsulated in base prompts for scalable apps.2,5

Prompt engineering bridges end-user inputs with models, acting as a skill for developers and a step in AI workflows, applicable in fields like healthcare, cybersecurity, and customer service.2,5

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Lilian Weng

Lilian Weng, Director of Applied AI Safety at OpenAI, stands out as the premier theorist linking prompt engineering to strategic AI deployment. Her seminal 2023 blog post, “Prompt Engineering Guide”, systematised techniques like chain-of-thought prompting, few-shot learning, and self-consistency, providing a foundational framework that influenced industry practices and tools from AWS to Google Cloud.1,4

Weng’s relationship to the term stems from her role in advancing reliable LLM interactions post-ChatGPT’s 2022 launch. At OpenAI, she pioneered safety-aligned prompting strategies, addressing hallucinations and biases—core challenges in generative AI—making her work indispensable for enterprise-scale optimisation.1,2 Her guide emphasises strategic structuring (e.g., role assignment, step-by-step reasoning) as a “roadmap” for desired outputs, directly shaping modern definitions and techniques like generated knowledge prompting.1,4

Biography: Born in China, Weng earned a PhD in Machine Learning from McGill University (2015), focusing on computational neuroscience and reinforcement learning. She joined OpenAI in 2018 as a research scientist, rising to lead long-term safety efforts amid rapid AI scaling. Previously at Microsoft Research (2016–2018), she specialised in hierarchical RL for robotics. Weng’s contributions extend to publications on emergent abilities in LLMs and AI alignment, with her GitHub repository on prompting garnering millions of views. As of 2026, she continues shaping ethical AI strategies, blending theoretical rigour with practical engineering.7

References

1. https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/prompt-engineering/

2. https://www.coursera.org/articles/what-is-prompt-engineering

3. https://uit.stanford.edu/service/techtraining/ai-demystified/prompt-engineering

4. https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-is-prompt-engineering

5. https://www.oracle.com/artificial-intelligence/prompt-engineering/

6. https://genai.byu.edu/prompt-engineering

7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prompt_engineering

8. https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/prompt-engineering

9. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-prompt-engineering

10. https://github.com/resources/articles/what-is-prompt-engineering

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Quote: Matt Sheehan

Quote: Matt Sheehan

“The Chinese chip industry has done an amazing job of catching up. I think they’ve probably exceeded most people’s expectations in this.” – Matt Sheehan – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Matt Sheehan’s remark captures a central surprise of the last decade in geopolitics and technology: the speed and resilience of China’s semiconductor ascent under heavy external pressure.

At the heart of this story is China’s effort to close what used to look like an unbridgeable gap with the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Europe in advanced chips, tools, and know-how. National programs such as “Made in China 2025” explicitly targeted semiconductors as a strategic chokepoint, aiming to localize production and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers in logic chips, memory, and manufacturing equipment.2 This was initially greeted with skepticism in many Western capitals and boardrooms, where the prevailing assumption was that export controls, restrictions on advanced tools, and China’s own technological lag would keep it permanently behind the frontier.

Sheehan’s observation points to where expectations proved wrong. Despite sweeping export controls on leading-edge lithography tools and high-end AI chips, Chinese firms have made faster-than-anticipated progress across the stack:

  • In manufacturing equipment, domestic suppliers have rapidly increased their share in key process steps such as etching and thin-film deposition.1,4 By 2025, the share of domestically developed semiconductor equipment in China’s fabs had risen to about 35%, overshooting Beijing’s 30% target for that year.1 Local champions like Naura and AMEC have pushed into complex tools, delivering CVD, ALD, and other thin-film equipment for advanced memory and logic production lines used by major Chinese foundries such as SMIC and Huahong.1,4
  • In capital investment and ecosystem depth, mainland China has become the largest market in the world for semiconductor manufacturing equipment, with projected spending around $39 billion in 2026—more than Taiwan or South Korea.4 This spending fuels a dense local ecosystem of design houses, foundries, packaging firms, and toolmakers that did not exist at comparable scale a decade earlier.
  • In AI and accelerator chips, Chinese firms have developed increasingly capable domestic alternatives even as they still seek access to high-end Nvidia GPUs. China’s AI sector drew global attention in 2025 with breakthroughs by firms such as DeepSeek, whose large models forced global competitors to reassess Chinese capabilities.5 At the same time, Beijing has leveraged its regulatory power to steer large platforms such as Alibaba and ByteDance toward a mix of imported and home-grown accelerators, explicitly tying access to Nvidia chips (like the H200) to parallel purchases of Chinese solutions.3,5 This policy mix illustrates how industrial strategy and geopolitical bargaining are being fused to accelerate domestic chip progress while still tapping global technology where possible.3
  • In memory and specialty devices, companies like Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) have moved up the learning curve in 3D NAND and are investing heavily in further technology upgrades, DRAM development, and forward-looking R&D that demand increasingly sophisticated domestically supplied equipment.1,4 These investments both absorb and shape the capabilities of the Chinese toolmakers that Sheehan has in mind.1,4

Sheehan’s quote is also rooted in the broader geopolitical context he studies: the U.S.–China technology rivalry, where semiconductors are the most strategically sensitive terrain. Washington’s use of export controls on advanced lithography, EDA tools, and high-end AI chips was designed to “slow the pace” of Chinese military-relevant innovation. The expectation in many Western policy circles was that these controls would significantly impede Chinese progress. Instead, controls have:

  • Reshaped China’s development path—from importing at the frontier to building domestically at one or two nodes behind it.
  • Accelerated Beijing’s urgency to build local capability in areas once left to foreign suppliers, such as inspection and metrology tools, deposition, and etch.1,4
  • Incentivized enormous sunk investment and political attention to semiconductors in China’s five-year plans, where AI and chips now sit at the very center of national strategy.5

Although China still faces real bottlenecks—most notably in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography, highly specialized tools, and some advanced process nodes—its system-level catch-up has been broader and quicker than many analysts predicted.2,5 That is the gap between expectation and reality that Sheehan is highlighting.

Matt Sheehan: The voice behind the quote

Matt Sheehan is a leading analyst of the intersection between China, technology, and global politics. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he has focused on how AI, semiconductors, and data flows shape the strategic competition between the United States and China. His work sits at the frontier of what is often called “digital geopolitics”: the study of how code, chips, and compute influence power, security, and economic advantage.

Sheehan’s analysis is distinctive for three reasons:

  • He combines on-the-ground understanding of Chinese policy and industry with close attention to U.S. regulatory moves, giving him a bilateral vantage point.
  • He approaches policy not just through national security, but also through the innovation ecosystem—research labs, startups, open-source communities, and global supply chains.
  • He emphasizes unexpected feedback loops: how U.S. restrictions can accelerate Chinese localization; how Chinese AI advances can reshape debates in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo; and how commercial competition and security fears reinforce each other.

This background makes his judgment on the pace of Chinese semiconductor catch-up particularly salient: he is not an industry booster, but a policy analyst who has watched the interplay of strategy, regulation, and technology on both sides.

The broader intellectual backdrop: leading theorists of technology, catch-up, and geopolitics

Behind a seemingly simple observation about China’s chip industry lies a rich body of theory about how countries catch up technologically, how innovation moves across borders, and how geopolitics shapes advanced industries. Several intellectual traditions are especially relevant.

1. Late industrialization and the “catch-up” state

Key figures: Alexander Gerschenkron, Alice Amsden, Ha-Joon Chang

  • Alexander Gerschenkron argued that “latecomer” countries industrialize differently from pioneers: they rely more heavily on state intervention, banks, and large industrial enterprises to compress decades of technological learning into a shorter period. China’s semiconductor push—state planning, giant national champions, directed finance, and targeted technology acquisition—is a textbook example of this latecomer pattern.
  • Alice Amsden studied how economies like South Korea used targeted industrial policy, performance standards, and learning-by-doing to build globally competitive heavy and high-tech industries. Her emphasis on reciprocal control mechanisms—state support in exchange for performance—echoes in China’s mix of subsidies and hard metrics for chip firms (e.g., equipment localization targets, process-node milestones).
  • Ha-Joon Chang brought this tradition into debates about globalization, arguing that today’s rich countries used aggressive industrial policies before later pushing “free-market” rules on latecomers. China’s semiconductor strategy—protecting and promoting domestic champions while acquiring foreign technology—is consistent with this “infant industry” logic, applied to the most complex manufacturing sector on earth.

These theorists provide the conceptual lens for understanding why China’s catch-up was plausible despite skepticism: latecomer states, given enough capital, policy focus, and market size, can leap across technological stages faster than many linear forecasts assume.

2. National innovation systems and technology policy

Key figures: Christopher Freeman, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Richard Nelson, Mariana Mazzucato

  • Christopher Freeman and Bengt-Åke Lundvall developed the idea of national innovation systems: webs of firms, universities, government agencies, and financial institutions that co-evolve to generate and diffuse innovation. China’s semiconductor rise reflects a deliberate effort to construct such a system around chips, combining universities, state labs, SOEs, private giants (like Alibaba and Huawei), and policy banks.
  • Richard Nelson emphasized how governments shape technological trajectories through defense spending, procurement, and research funding. U.S. policies around semiconductors and AI mirrors this; China’s own national funds and state procurement echo similar mechanisms, but at enormous scale.
  • Mariana Mazzucato introduced the idea of the “entrepreneurial state”, arguing that the public sector often takes the riskiest, most uncertain bets in breakthrough technologies. China’s massive and politically risky bets on semiconductor self-reliance—despite early policy failures and wasted capital—are a stark, real-time illustration of this concept.

These frameworks show why China’s chip gains are not just about firm-level success, but about system-level design: how policy, finance, and research infrastructure have been orchestrated to accelerate domestic capability.

3. Global value chains and “smile curves”

Key figures: Gary Gereffi, Timothy Sturgeon, Michael Porter

  • Gary Gereffi and Timothy Sturgeon analyzed how industries fragment into global value chains, with design, manufacturing, and services allocated across countries according to capabilities and policy regimes. Semiconductors are the archetype: U.S. firms dominate GPUs and EDA tools; Taiwanese and Korean firms dominate advanced wafer fabrication and memory; Dutch and Japanese firms produce critical tools; Chinese firms historically concentrated on assembly, packaging, and lower-end fabrication.
  • In this framework, export controls and industrial policies are attempts to reshape where in the chain China sits—from lower-value segments toward high-value design, advanced fabrication, and toolmaking.2
  • The “smile curve” metaphor (popularized by Acer’s Stan Shih and linked to strategy thinkers like Michael Porter) suggests that value accrues at the edges: upstream in R&D and design, and downstream in brands, platforms, and services. For years, China captured more value in downstream device assembly and domestic platforms; Sheehan’s quote highlights China’s effort to climb the upstream side of the smile curve into high-value chip design and equipment.

4. Technology, geopolitics, and “weaponized interdependence”

Key figures: Henry Farrell, Abraham Newman, Michael Beckley, Graham Allison

  • Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman advanced the concept of “weaponized interdependence”: states that control key hubs in global networks—financial, digital, or industrial—can use that position for coercive leverage. U.S. control over advanced lithography, chip design IP, and high-end AI hardware is one of the clearest real-world illustrations of this idea.
  • The use of export controls and entity lists against Chinese tech firms is an application of this theory; China’s accelerated semiconductor localization is, in turn, a strategy to escape vulnerability to that leverage.
  • Analysts such as Michael Beckley and Graham Allison focus on U.S.–China strategic competition, emphasizing how control of technologies like semiconductors shapes long-term power balances. For them, the pace of China’s chip catch-up is a central variable in the evolving balance of power.

Sheehan’s quote sits squarely in this intellectual conversation: it is an empirical judgment that bears directly on theories about whether technological chokepoints are sustainable and how quickly a targeted great power can adjust.

5. AI, compute, and the geopolitics of chips

Key figures: Jack Clark, Allan Dafoe, Daron Acemoglu, Ajay Agrawal

  • Researchers of AI governance and economics increasingly treat compute and semiconductors as the strategic bottleneck for AI progress. Analysts like Jack Clark have emphasized how access to advanced accelerators shapes which countries can realistically train frontier models.
  • Economists such as Daron Acemoglu and Ajay Agrawal highlight how AI and automation interact with productivity, inequality, and industrial structure. In China, AI and chips are now deeply intertwined: domestic AI labs both depend on and stimulate demand for advanced chips; chips, in turn, are justified politically as enablers of AI and digital sovereignty.2,5
  • The result is a feedback loop: AI breakthroughs (such as those highlighted by Xi Jinping in 2025) strengthen the case for aggressive semiconductor policy; semiconductor gains then enable more ambitious AI projects.5

This body of work provides the conceptual scaffolding for understanding why a statement about Chinese chip catch-up is not just about manufacturing, but about the future distribution of AI capability, economic power, and geopolitical influence.

Placed against this backdrop, Matt Sheehan’s line is more than a passing compliment to Chinese engineers. It crystallizes a broader reality: in one of the world’s most complex, capital-intensive, and tightly controlled industries, China has closed more of the gap, more quickly, under more adverse conditions than most experts anticipated. That surprise is now reshaping policy debates in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei—and forcing a re-examination of many long-held assumptions about how fast latecomers can move at the technological frontier.

 

References

1. https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3339366/great-chip-leap-chinas-semiconductor-equipment-self-reliance-surges-past-targets

2. https://www.techinsights.com/chinese-semiconductor-developments

3. https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/china-expected-to-approve-h200-imports-in-early-2026-report-claims-tech-giants-alibaba-and-bytedance-reportedly-ready-to-order-over-200-000-nvidia-chips-each-if-green-lit-by-beijing

4. https://eu.36kr.com/en/p/3634463429494016

5. https://dig.watch/updates/china-ai-breakthroughs-xi-jinping

6. https://expertnetworkcalls.com/93/semiconductor-market-outlook-key-trends-and-challenges-in-2026

7. https://sourceability.com/post/whats-ahead-in-2026-for-the-semiconductor-industry

8. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/pwc-semiconductor-and-beyond-2026-full-report.pdf

 

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The AI Signal from The World Economic Forum 2026 at Davos

The AI Signal from The World Economic Forum 2026 at Davos

Davos 2026 ( WEF26 ) signalled a clear shift in the AI conversation: less speculation, more execution. For most corporates, the infrastructure stack matters, but it will be accessed via hyperscalers and service providers rather than built internally. The more relevant question is what happens inside the organisation once the capability is available.

A consistent theme across discussions: progress is coming from pragmatic leaders who are treating AI as an operating model change, not a technology project. That means building basic literacy across the workforce, redesigning workflows, and being willing to challenge legacy assumptions about how work gets done.

In the full write-up:

  • The shift from “AI theatre” to ROI and deployment reality
  • The five-layer AI stack (and why corporates mostly consume it via partners)
  • The emerging sixth layer: user readiness — and why it is becoming decisive
  • Energy and infrastructure constraints as real-world brakes on scale
  • Corporate pragmatism: moving beyond an “AI veneer” to process redesign and agentic workflows
  • Labour market implications: skills shifts, entry-level hollowing, and what employers must do now
  • The Global South dimension: barriers, pathways to competitiveness, and practical adoption strategies
  • Second-order risks: cyber exposure, mental health, and cognitive atrophy as governance issues

If you’re leading a business, the takeaway is straightforward: there are strong lessons from pragmatic programs outside of Silicon Valley.

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Quote: Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

Quote: Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

“We assess that 40% of jobs globally are going to be impacted by AI over the next couple of years – either enhanced, eliminated, or transformed. In advanced economies, it’s 60%.” – Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

Kristalina Georgieva’s assessment of AI’s labour market impact represents one of the most consequential economic forecasts of our time. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund articulated a sobering reality: artificial intelligence is not a distant threat but an immediate force already reshaping employment globally. Her invocation of a “tsunami”-a natural disaster of overwhelming force and scale-captures the simultaneity and inevitability of this transformation.

The Scale of Disruption

Georgieva’s figures warrant careful examination. The IMF calculates that 40 per cent of jobs globally will be touched by AI, with each affected role falling into one of three categories: enhancement (where AI augments human capability), elimination (where automation replaces human labour), or transformation (where roles are fundamentally altered without necessarily improving compensation). This is not speculative projection but empirical assessment grounded in IMF research across member economies.

The geographical disparity is striking and consequential. In advanced economies-the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and similar developed nations-the figure reaches 60 per cent. By contrast, in low-income countries, the impact ranges from 20 to 26 per cent. This divergence is not accidental; it reflects the concentration of AI infrastructure, capital investment, and digital integration in wealthy nations. The IMF’s concern, as Georgieva articulated, is what she termed an “accordion of opportunities”-a compression and expansion of economic possibility that varies dramatically by geography and development status.

Understanding the Context: AI as Economic Transformation

Georgieva’s warning must be situated within the broader economic moment of early 2026. The global economy faces simultaneous pressures: geopolitical fragmentation, demographic shifts, climate transition, and technological disruption occurring in parallel. AI is not the sole driver of economic uncertainty, but it is perhaps the most visible and immediate.

The IMF’s analysis distinguishes between AI’s productivity benefits and its labour market risks. Georgieva acknowledged that AI is generating genuine economic gains across sectors-agriculture, healthcare, education, and transport have all experienced productivity enhancements. Translation and interpretation services have been enhanced rather than eliminated; research analysts have found their work augmented by AI tools. Yet these gains are unevenly distributed, and the labour market adjustment required is unprecedented in speed and scale.

The productivity question is central to Georgieva’s economic outlook. Global growth has been underwhelming in recent years, with productivity growth stagnant except in the United States. AI represents the most potent force for reversing this trend, with potential to boost global growth between 0.1 and 0.8 per cent annually. A 0.8 per cent productivity gain would restore growth to pre-pandemic levels. Yet this upside scenario depends entirely on successful labour market adjustment and equitable distribution of AI’s benefits.

The Theoretical Foundations: Labour Economics and Technological Disruption

Georgieva’s analysis draws on decades of labour economics scholarship examining technological displacement. The intellectual lineage traces to economists such as David Autor, who has extensively studied how technological change reshapes labour markets. Autor’s research demonstrates that whilst technology eliminates routine tasks, it simultaneously creates demand for new skills and complementary labour. However, this adjustment is neither automatic nor painless; workers displaced from routine cognitive tasks often face years of unemployment or underemployment before transitioning to new roles.

The “task-based” framework of labour economics-developed by scholars including Autor and Frank Levy-provides the theoretical scaffolding for understanding AI’s impact. Rather than viewing jobs as monolithic units, this approach recognises that occupations comprise multiple tasks. AI may automate certain tasks within a role whilst leaving others intact, fundamentally altering job content and skill requirements. A radiologist’s role, for instance, may be transformed by AI’s superior pattern recognition in image analysis, but the radiologist’s diagnostic judgment, patient communication, and clinical decision-making remain valuable.

Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, prominent technology economists, have argued that AI represents a qualitative shift from previous technological waves. Unlike earlier automation, which primarily affected routine manual labour, AI threatens cognitive work across income levels. Their research suggests that without deliberate policy intervention, AI could exacerbate inequality rather than reduce it, concentrating gains among capital owners and highly skilled workers whilst displacing middle-skill employment.

Daron Acemoglu, the MIT economist, has been particularly critical of “so-so automation”-technology that increases productivity marginally whilst displacing workers without creating sufficient new opportunities. His work emphasises that technological outcomes are not predetermined; they depend on institutional choices, investment priorities, and policy frameworks. This perspective is crucial for understanding Georgieva’s policy recommendations.

The Policy Imperative

Georgieva’s framing of the challenge as a policy problem rather than an inevitable outcome reflects this economic thinking. She has consistently advocated for three policy pillars: investment in skills development, meaningful regulation and ethical frameworks, and ensuring AI’s benefits penetrate across sectors and geographies rather than concentrating in advanced economies.

The IMF’s own research indicates that one in ten jobs in advanced economies already require substantially new skills-a figure that will accelerate. Yet educational and training systems globally remain poorly aligned with AI-era skill demands. Georgieva has urged governments to invest in reskilling programmes, particularly targeting workers in roles most vulnerable to displacement.

Her emphasis on regulation and ethics reflects growing recognition that AI’s trajectory is not technologically determined. The choice between AI as a tool for broad-based productivity enhancement versus a mechanism for labour displacement and inequality concentration remains open. This aligns with the work of scholars such as Shoshana Zuboff, who argues that technological systems embody political choices about power distribution and social organisation.

The Global Inequality Dimension

Perhaps most significant is Georgieva’s concern about the “accordion of opportunities.” The 60 per cent figure for advanced economies versus 20-26 per cent for low-income countries reflects not merely different levels of AI adoption but fundamentally different economic trajectories. Advanced economies possess the infrastructure, capital, and institutional capacity to invest in AI whilst simultaneously managing labour market transition. Low-income countries risk being left behind-neither benefiting from AI’s productivity gains nor receiving the investment in skills and social protection that might cushion displacement.

This concern echoes the work of development economists such as Dani Rodrik, who has documented how technological change can bypass developing economies entirely, leaving them trapped in low-productivity sectors. If AI concentrates in advanced economies and wealthy sectors, developing nations may face a new form of technological colonialism-dependent on imported AI solutions without developing indigenous capacity or capturing value creation.

The Measurement Challenge

Georgieva’s 40 per cent figure, whilst grounded in IMF research, represents a probabilistic assessment rather than a precise prediction. The IMF acknowledges a “fairly big range” of potential impacts on global growth (0.1 to 0.8 per cent), reflecting genuine uncertainty about AI’s trajectory. This uncertainty itself is significant; it suggests that outcomes remain contingent on policy choices, investment decisions, and institutional responses.

The distinction between jobs “touched” by AI and jobs eliminated is crucial. Enhancement and transformation may be preferable to elimination, but they still require worker adjustment, skill development, and potentially geographic mobility. A job that is transformed but offers no wage improvement-as Georgieva noted-may be economically worse for the worker even if technically retained.

The Broader Economic Context

Georgieva’s warning arrives amid broader economic fragmentation. Trade tensions, geopolitical competition, and the shift from a rules-based global economic order toward competing blocs create additional uncertainty. AI development is increasingly intertwined with strategic competition between major powers, particularly between the United States and China. This geopolitical dimension means that AI’s labour market impact cannot be separated from questions of technological sovereignty, supply chain resilience, and economic security.

The IMF chief has also emphasised that AI’s benefits are not automatic. She personally undertook training in AI productivity tools, including Microsoft Copilot, and urged IMF staff to embrace AI-based enhancements. Yet this individual adoption, multiplied across millions of workers and organisations, requires deliberate choice, investment in training, and organisational restructuring. The productivity gains Georgieva projects depend on this active embrace rather than passive exposure to AI technology.

Implications for Policy and Strategy

Georgieva’s analysis suggests several imperatives for policymakers. First, labour market adjustment cannot be left to market forces alone; deliberate investment in education, training, and social protection is essential. Second, the distribution of AI’s benefits matters as much as aggregate productivity gains; without attention to equity, AI could deepen inequality within and between nations. Third, regulation and ethical frameworks must be established proactively rather than reactively, shaping AI development toward socially beneficial outcomes.

Her invocation of a “tsunami” is not mere rhetoric but a precise characterisation of the challenge’s scale and urgency. Tsunamis cannot be prevented, but their impact can be mitigated through preparation, early warning systems, and coordinated response. Similarly, AI’s labour market impact is largely inevitable, but its consequences-whether broadly shared prosperity or concentrated disruption-remain subject to human choice and institutional design.

References

1. https://economictimes.com/news/india/ashwini-vaishnaw-at-davos-2026-5-key-takeaways-highlighting-indias-semiconductor-pitch-and-roadmap-to-ai-sovereignty-at-wef/slideshow/127145496.cms

2. https://time.com/collections/davos-2026/7339218/ai-trade-global-economy-kristalina-georgieva-imf/

3. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/a-tsunami-is-hitting-labour-market-international-monetary-fund-imf-chief-kristalina-georgieva-warns-of-ai-impact-10796739

4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ANV7yuaTuA

5. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/live-from-davos-2026-what-to-know-on-day-2/

6. https://www.perplexity.ai/page/ai-impact-on-jobs-debated-as-l-_a7uZvVcQmWh3CsTzWfkbA

7. https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/01/14/ai-will-transform-the-global-economy-lets-make-sure-it-benefits-humanity

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Quote: Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

Quote: Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

“Productivity growth has been slow over the last two decades. AI holds a promise to significantly lift it. We calculated that the impact on global growth could be between 0,1% and 0,8%. That is very significant. However, it is happening incredibly quickly.” – Kristalina Georgieva – Managing Director, IMF

Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has emerged as one of the most influential voices in the global conversation about artificial intelligence’s economic impact. Her observation about productivity growth-and AI’s potential to reverse it-reflects a fundamental shift in how policymakers understand the relationship between technological innovation and economic resilience.

The Productivity Crisis That Defined Two Decades

To understand Georgieva’s urgency about AI, one must first grasp the economic malaise that has characterised the past twenty years. Since the 2008 financial crisis, advanced economies have experienced persistently weak productivity growth-the measure of how much output an economy generates per unit of input. This sluggish productivity has become the primary culprit behind anaemic economic growth across developed nations. Georgieva has repeatedly emphasised that approximately half of the slow growth experienced globally stems directly from this productivity deficit, a structural problem that conventional policy tools have struggled to address.

This two-decade productivity drought represents more than a statistical curiosity. It reflects an economy that, despite technological advancement, has failed to translate innovation into widespread efficiency gains. Workers produce less per hour worked. Businesses struggle to achieve meaningful cost reductions. Investment returns diminish. The result is an economy trapped in a low-growth equilibrium, unable to generate the dynamism required to address mounting fiscal challenges, rising inequality, and demographic pressures.

AI as Economic Catalyst: The Quantified Promise

Georgieva’s confidence in AI stems from rigorous analysis rather than technological evangelism. The IMF has calculated that artificial intelligence could boost global growth by between 0.1 and 0.8 percentage points-a range that, whilst appearing modest in isolation, becomes transformative when contextualised against current growth trajectories. For an advanced economy growing at 1-2 percent annually, an additional 0.8 percentage points represents a 40-80 percent acceleration. For developing economies, the multiplier effect could be even more pronounced.

This quantification matters because it grounds AI’s potential in measurable economic impact rather than speculative hype. The IMF’s methodology reflects analysis of AI’s capacity to enhance productivity across multiple sectors-from agriculture and healthcare to education and transportation. Unlike previous technological revolutions that took decades to diffuse through economies, AI applications are already penetrating operational workflows at unprecedented speed.

The Velocity Problem: Why Speed Reshapes the Equation

Georgieva’s most critical insight concerns not the magnitude of AI’s impact but its velocity. Technological transformations typically unfold gradually, allowing labour markets, educational systems, and social safety nets time to adapt. The Industrial Revolution took generations. The digital revolution unfolded over decades. AI, by contrast, is compressing transformation into years.

This acceleration creates what Georgieva describes as a “tsunami” effect on labour markets. The IMF’s assessment indicates that 40 percent of global jobs will be impacted by AI within the coming years-either enhanced through augmentation, fundamentally transformed, or eliminated entirely. In advanced economies, the figure rises to 60 percent. Simultaneously, preliminary data suggests that one in ten jobs in advanced economies already require new skills, a proportion that will accelerate dramatically.

The velocity problem generates a dual challenge: whilst AI promises to solve the productivity crisis that has constrained growth for two decades, it simultaneously threatens to outpace society’s capacity to manage labour market disruption. This is why Georgieva emphasises that the economic benefits of AI cannot be assumed to distribute evenly or automatically. The speed of technological change can easily outstrip the speed of policy adaptation, education reform, and social support systems.

Theoretical Foundations: Understanding Productivity and Growth

Georgieva’s analysis builds upon decades of economic theory regarding the relationship between productivity and growth. The Solow growth model, developed by Nobel laureate Robert Solow in the 1950s, established that long-term economic growth depends primarily on technological progress and productivity improvements rather than capital accumulation alone. This framework explains why economies with similar capital stocks can diverge dramatically based on their capacity to innovate and improve efficiency.

The productivity slowdown that has characterised recent decades puzzled economists, leading to what some termed the “productivity paradox”-the observation that despite massive investment in information technology, measured productivity growth remained disappointingly weak. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, leading scholars of technology’s economic impact, have argued that this paradox reflects a measurement problem: much of technology’s benefit accrues as consumer surplus rather than measured output, and the transition period between technological eras involves disruption that temporarily suppresses measured productivity.

AI potentially resolves this paradox by offering productivity gains that are both measurable and broad-based. Unlike previous waves of automation that concentrated benefits in specific sectors, AI’s general-purpose nature means it can enhance productivity across virtually every economic activity. This aligns with the theoretical work of economists like Daron Acemoglu, who emphasises that sustained growth requires technologies that complement rather than simply replace human labour, creating new opportunities for value creation.

The IMF’s Institutional Perspective

As Managing Director of the IMF, Georgieva speaks from an institution uniquely positioned to assess global economic trends. The Fund monitors economic performance across 190 member countries, providing unparalleled visibility into comparative growth patterns, labour market dynamics, and policy effectiveness. Her warnings about AI’s labour market impact carry weight precisely because they emerge from this comprehensive global perspective rather than from any single national vantage point.

The IMF’s own experience with AI implementation reinforces Georgieva’s optimism about productivity gains. As a data-intensive institution, the Fund has deployed AI-powered tools to enhance analytical capacity, accelerate research, and improve forecasting accuracy. Georgieva has personally engaged with productivity-enhancing AI tools, including Microsoft Copilot and fund-specific AI assistants, and reports measurable gains in institutional output. This first-hand experience lends credibility to her broader claims about AI’s transformative potential.

The Policy Imperative: Managing Transformation

Georgieva’s framing of AI’s impact as both opportunity and risk reflects a sophisticated understanding of technological change. The productivity gains she describes will not materialise automatically; they require deliberate policy choices. For advanced economies, she counsels concentration on three areas: ensuring AI penetration across all economic sectors rather than concentrating benefits in technology-intensive industries; establishing meaningful regulatory frameworks that reduce risks of misuse and unintended consequences; and building ethical foundations that maintain public trust in AI systems.

Critically, Georgieva emphasises that the labour market challenge demands proactive intervention. The speed of AI adoption means that waiting for market forces to naturally realign skills and employment will result in unnecessary disruption and inequality. Instead, she advocates for policies that support reskilling, particularly targeting workers in roles most vulnerable to displacement. The IMF’s research suggests that higher-skilled workers benefit disproportionately from AI augmentation, creating a risk of widening inequality unless deliberate efforts ensure that lower-skilled workers also gain access to AI-enhanced productivity tools.

Global Context: Divergence and Opportunity

Georgieva’s analysis of AI’s growth potential must be understood within the broader context of global economic divergence. The United States, which has emerged as the global leader in large-language model development and AI commercialisation, stands to capture disproportionate benefits from AI-driven productivity gains. This concentration of AI capability in a single economy risks exacerbating existing inequalities between advanced and developing nations.

However, Georgieva’s emphasis on AI’s application layer-rather than merely its development-suggests opportunities for broader participation. Countries with strong capabilities in enterprise software, business process outsourcing, and operational integration, such as India, can leverage AI to enhance service delivery and create new value propositions. This perspective challenges the notion that AI benefits will concentrate exclusively in technology-leading nations, though it requires deliberate policy choices to realise this potential.

The Uncertainty Framework

Georgieva frequently describes the contemporary global environment as one where “uncertainty is the new normal.” This framing contextualises her AI analysis within a broader landscape of simultaneous transformations-geopolitical fragmentation, demographic shifts, climate change, and trade tensions all accelerating simultaneously. AI does not exist in isolation; it emerges as one force among many reshaping the global economy.

This multiplicity of transformations creates what Georgieva terms “more fog within which we operate.” Policymakers cannot assume that historical relationships between variables will hold. The interaction between AI-driven productivity gains, trade tensions, demographic decline in advanced economies, and climate-related resource constraints creates a genuinely novel economic environment. This is why Georgieva emphasises the need for international coordination, adaptive policy frameworks, and institutional flexibility.

Conclusion: The Productivity Imperative

Georgieva’s statement about AI and productivity growth reflects a conviction grounded in both rigorous analysis and institutional responsibility. The two-decade productivity drought has constrained growth, limited policy options, and contributed to the political instability and inequality that characterise contemporary democracies. AI offers a genuine opportunity to reverse this trajectory, but only if its benefits are deliberately distributed and its disruptions actively managed. The speed of AI’s development means that the window for shaping this outcome is narrow. Policymakers who treat AI as merely a technological phenomenon rather than as an economic and social challenge risk squandering the productivity gains Georgieva describes, converting opportunity into disruption.

References

1. https://time.com/collections/davos-2026/7339218/ai-trade-global-economy-kristalina-georgieva-imf/

2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ANV7yuaTuA

3. https://economictimes.com/news/india/clash-at-davos-why-india-refuses-to-be-a-second-tier-ai-power/articleshow/127012696.cms

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Term: Acquihire

Term: Acquihire

“An acquihire (acquisition + hire) is a business strategy where a company buys another, smaller company primarily for its talented employees, rather than its products or technology, often to quickly gain skilled teams.” – Acquihire –

An acquihire (a portmanteau of “acquisition” and “hire”) is a business strategy in which a larger company acquires a smaller firm, such as a startup, primarily to recruit its skilled employees or entire teams, rather than for its products, services, technology, or customer base.1,2,3,7 This approach enables rapid talent acquisition, often bypassing traditional hiring processes, while the acquired company’s offerings are typically deprioritised or discontinued post-deal.1,4,7

Key Characteristics and Process

Acquihires emphasise human capital over tangible assets, with the acquiring firm integrating the talent to fill skill gaps, drive innovation, or enhance competitiveness—particularly in tech sectors where specialised expertise like AI or engineering is scarce.1,2,6 The process generally unfolds in structured stages:

  • Identifying needs and targets: The acquirer conducts a skills gap analysis and scouts startups with aligned, high-performing teams via networks or advisors.2,3,6
  • Due diligence and negotiation: Focus shifts to talent assessment, cultural fit, retention incentives, and compensation, rather than product valuation; deals often include retention bonuses.3,6
  • Integration: Acquired employees transition into the larger firm, leveraging its resources for stability and scaled projects, though risks like cultural clashes or talent loss exist.1,3

For startups, acquihires provide an exit amid funding shortages, offering employees better opportunities, while acquirers gain entrepreneurial spirit and eliminate nascent competition.1,7

Strategic Benefits and Drawbacks

Aspect Benefits for Acquirer Benefits for Acquired Firm/Team Potential Drawbacks
Talent Access Swift onboarding of proven teams, infusing fresh ideas1,2 Stability, resources, career growth1 High costs if talent departs post-deal3
Speed Faster than individual hires4,6 Liquidity for founders/investors4 Products often shelved, eroding startup value7
Competition Neutralises rivals1,7 Access to larger markets1 Cultural mismatches3

Acquihires surged in Silicon Valley post-2008, with valuations tied to per-engineer pricing (e.g., $1–2 million per key hire).7

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Mark Zuckerberg

Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Meta (formerly Facebook), stands out as the preeminent figure linked to acquihiring, having pioneered its strategic deployment to preserve startup agility within a scaling giant.7 His philosophy framed acquihires as dual tools for talent infusion and cultural retention, explicitly stating that “hiring entrepreneurs helped Facebook retain its start-up culture.”7

Biography and Backstory: Born in 1984 in New York, Zuckerberg co-founded Facebook in 2004 from his Harvard dorm, launching a platform that redefined social networking and grew to billions of users.7 By the late 2000s, as Facebook ballooned, it faced talent wars and innovation plateaus amid competition from nimble startups. Zuckerberg championed acquihires as a counter-strategy, masterminding over 50 such deals totalling hundreds of millions—exemplars include:

  • FriendFeed (2009, ~$50 million): Hired founder Bret Taylor (ex-Google, PayPal) as CTO, injecting search expertise.7
  • Chai Labs (2010): Recruited Gokul Rajaram for product innovation.7
  • Beluga (2010, ~$10 million): Team built Facebook Messenger, launching to 750 million users in months.7
  • Others like Drop.io (Sam Lessin) and Rel8tion (Peter Wilson), exceeding $67 million combined.7

These moves exemplified three motives Zuckerberg articulated: strategic (elevating founders to leadership), innovation (rapid feature development), and product enhancement.7 Unlike traditional M&A, his acquihires prioritised “acqui-hiring” founders into high roles, fostering Meta’s entrepreneurial ethos amid explosive growth. Critics note antitrust scrutiny (e.g., Instagram, WhatsApp debates), but Zuckerberg’s playbook influenced tech giants like Google and Apple, cementing acquihiring as a core talent strategy.7 His approach evolved with Meta’s empire-building, blending opportunism with long-term vision.

References

1. https://mightyfinancial.com/glossary/acquihire/

2. https://allegrow.com/acquire-hire-strategies/

3. https://velocityglobal.com/resources/blog/acquihire-process

4. https://visible.vc/blog/acquihire/

5. https://eqvista.com/acqui-hire-an-effective-talent-acquisition-strategy/

6. https://wowremoteteams.com/glossary-term/acqui-hiring/

7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acqui-hiring

8. https://a16z.com/the-complete-guide-to-acquihires/

9. https://www.mascience.com/podcast/executing-acquihires

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Quote: Kazuo Ishiguro

Quote: Kazuo Ishiguro

“While it is all very well to talk of ‘turning points’, one can surely only recognize such moments in retrospect.” – Kazuo Ishiguro – The Remains of the Day

The Quote in Context

“While it is all very well to talk of ‘turning points’, one can surely only recognize such moments in retrospect.” This line, spoken by the protagonist Stevens in Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day, captures the novel’s central theme of hindsight and regret. Stevens reflects on his life of unwavering duty as a butler, questioning whether pivotal decisions—such as suppressing his emotions for Miss Kenton or blindly serving Lord Darlington—could have been foreseen as life-altering. The surrounding narrative expands: “But then, I suppose, when with the benefit of hindsight one begins to search one’s past for such ‘turning points’, one is apt to start seeing them everywhere,” and “But what is the sense in forever speculating what might have happened had such and such a moment turned out differently?”3,4,5 These thoughts arise as Stevens drives across England in 1956, revisiting his past amid a changing post-war world, realizing his pursuit of “dignity” through professionalism has left him emotionally barren.

Kazuo Ishiguro: Life and Legacy

Kazuo Ishiguro, born in 1954 in Nagasaki, Japan, moved to England at age five, where he was raised in Guildford, Surrey. His early life bridged cultures: Japanese heritage shaped his themes of memory, loss, and restraint, while British education immersed him in its class structures and imperial history. He studied English and philosophy at the University of Kent, then creative writing at the University of East Anglia under Malcolm Bradbury. Ishiguro’s debut novel A Pale View of Hills (1982) drew from his parents’ Hiroshima experiences; An Artist of the Floating World (1986) explored post-war Japanese guilt.

The Remains of the Day (1989), his third novel, marked his breakthrough. Narrated by Stevens, an impeccably dutiful butler at Darlington Hall in the 1930s, it chronicles his suppressed romance with housekeeper Miss Kenton and his service to Lord Darlington, a well-meaning aristocrat who unwittingly aids pro-Nazi appeasement. Stevens’s road trip decades later forces confrontation with missed opportunities. The Booker Prize-winning novel critiques English stoicism, loyalty’s cost, and hindsight’s clarity. It inspired the 1993 Merchant Ivory film starring Anthony Hopkins and Emma Thompson. Ishiguro won the 2017 Nobel Prize in Literature for “uncovering the abyss beneath our illusory sense of connection with the world.” His works, including Never Let Me Go (2005) and Klara and the Sun (2021), consistently probe unreliable memory and human fragility.

The Novel’s Backstory and Historical Context

Published amid Thatcher-era Britain, The Remains of the Day dissects interwar aristocracy’s decline. Stevens embodies “great butler” ideals from P.G. Wodehouse’s Jeeves or Saki’s Edwardian tales, yet Ishiguro subverts them: Stevens’s “dignity”—stoic suppression of self—mirrors Britain’s appeasement of Hitler, as Lord Darlington hosts pro-German conferences. Quotes like “Lord Darlington wasn’t a bad man… He chose a certain path in life, it proved to be a misguided one… As for myself, I cannot even claim that. You see, I trusted” underscore blind loyalty’s tragedy.1 The 1930s setting evokes real history: Darlington echoes figures like Lord Halifax, who favored Nazi conciliation. Stevens’s regret—”What a terrible mistake I’ve made with my life”—peaks in his reunion with Miss Kenton, affirming no turning back.1 Ishiguro drew from his father’s tales of English formality and researched butlers’ memoirs, blending personal exile with national introspection.

Leading Theorists on Hindsight, Regret, and Turning Points

Ishiguro’s meditation on retrospective recognition aligns with psychological and philosophical theories of hindsight bias—the tendency to view past events as predictably inevitable—and counterfactual thinking, imagining “what if” alternatives. Key figures include:

  • Baruch Fischhoff (Hindsight Bias Pioneer): In 1975, Fischhoff coined “hindsight bias” (“I-knew-it-all-along” effect), showing people overestimate past foreseeability. Experiments revealed subjects judge historical events like Pearl Harbor as more predictable post-facto, mirroring Stevens’s retrospective “turning points.”3,4 Fischhoff’s work, expanded in Hindsight ? Foresight (1982), explains why regret amplifies illusory clarity.

  • Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Prospect Theory and Regret): Nobel-winning psychologists (2002 for Kahneman) developed prospect theory (1979), framing decisions around gains/losses. Their regret theory (1982) posits people ruminate on inaction regrets more than action ones—Stevens laments not pursuing Miss Kenton. Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) links this to System 1 intuition versus System 2 reflection, fueling Stevens’s late epiphany.5

  • Neal Roese (Counterfactual Thinking): Roese’s 1990s research defines upward counterfactuals (imagining better outcomes) as driving regret but also improvement. In If Only (2005), he analyzes how “turning points” emerge in hindsight, urging functional use over rumination—echoing Stevens’s futile speculation: “What can we ever gain in forever looking back?”1,2

  • Philosophical Roots: Søren Kierkegaard: The 19th-century existentialist in Repetition (1843) and The Sickness Unto Death (1849) explored despair from inauthentic life choices, akin to Stevens’s “dignity” facade. Kierkegaard argued authentic “leaps” are unrecognizable prospectively, only retrospectively meaningful.

  • Jean-Paul Sartre (Existential Regret): In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre’s “bad faith” describes self-deception to evade freedom’s anguish. Stevens’s duty-as-vocation exemplifies this, regretting unchosen paths only in retrospect.

These theorists illuminate Ishiguro’s insight: turning points are myths of hindsight, breeding regret unless harnessed for forward momentum. Stevens’s story warns of dignity’s peril when it stifles agency.

References

1. https://www.siquanong.com/book-summaries/the-remains-of-the-day/

2. https://quotefancy.com/quote/1914384/Kazuo-Ishiguro-For-a-great-many-people-the-evening-is-the-most-enjoyable-part-of-the-day

3. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/431607-in-any-case-while-it-is-all-very-well-to

4. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/623975-but-then-i-suppose-when-with-the-benefit-of-hindsight

5. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/206103-but-what-is-the-sense-in-forever-speculating-what-might

6. https://www.whatshouldireadnext.com/quotes/kazuo-ishiguro-but-what-is-the-sense

7. https://www.cliffsnotes.com/literature/the-remains-of-the-day/quotes

8. https://www.allgreatquotes.com/the_remains_of_the_day_quotes.shtml

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Term: Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)

Term: Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)

“A Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) custom-designed by Google to accelerate machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) workloads, especially those involving neural networks.” – Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)

A Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) custom-designed by Google to accelerate machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) workloads, particularly those involving neural networks and matrix multiplication operations.1,2,4,6

Core Architecture and Functionality

TPUs excel at high-throughput, parallel processing of mathematical tasks such as multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations, which form the backbone of neural network training and inference. Each TPU features a Matrix Multiply Unit (MXU)—a systolic array of arithmetic logic units (ALUs), typically configured as 128×128 or 256×256 grids—that performs thousands of MAC operations per clock cycle using formats like 8-bit integers, BFloat16, or floating-point arithmetic.1,2,5,9 Supporting components include a Vector Processing Unit (VPU) for non-linear activations (e.g., ReLU, sigmoid) and High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) to minimise data bottlenecks by enabling rapid data retrieval and storage.2,5

Unlike general-purpose CPUs or even GPUs, TPUs are purpose-built for ML models relying on matrix processing, large batch sizes, and extended training periods (e.g., weeks for convolutional neural networks), offering superior efficiency in power consumption and speed for tasks like image recognition, natural language processing, and generative AI.1,3,6 They integrate seamlessly with frameworks such as TensorFlow, JAX, and PyTorch, processing input data as vectors in parallel before outputting results to ML models.1,4

Key Applications and Deployment

  • Cloud Computing: TPUs power Google Cloud Platform (GCP) services for AI workloads, including chatbots, recommendation engines, speech synthesis, computer vision, and products like Google Search, Maps, Photos, and Gemini.1,2,3
  • Edge Computing: Suitable for real-time ML at data sources, such as IoT in factories or autonomous vehicles, where high-throughput matrix operations are needed.1
    TPUs support both training (e.g., model development) and inference (e.g., predictions on new data), with pods scaling to thousands of chips for massive workloads.6,7

Development History

Google developed TPUs internally from 2015 for TensorFlow-based neural networks, deploying them in data centres before releasing versions for third-party use via GCP in 2018.1,4 Evolution includes shifts in array sizes (e.g., v1: 256×256 on 8-bit integers; later versions: 128×128 on BFloat16; v6: back to 256×256) and proprietary interconnects for enhanced scalability.5,6

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Norman Foster Ramsey

The most pertinent strategy theorist linked to TPU development is Norman Foster Ramsey (1915–2011), a Nobel Prize-winning physicist whose foundational work on quantum computing architectures and coherent manipulation of quantum states directly influenced the parallel processing paradigms underpinning TPUs. Ramsey’s concepts of separated oscillatory fields—a technique for precisely controlling atomic transitions using microwave pulses separated in space and time—paved the way for systolic arrays and matrix-based computation in specialised hardware, which TPUs exemplify through their MXU grids for simultaneous MAC operations.5 This quantum-inspired parallelism optimises energy efficiency and throughput, mirroring Ramsey’s emphasis on minimising decoherence (data loss) in high-dimensional systems.

Biography and Relationship to the Term: Born in Washington, D.C., Ramsey earned his PhD from Columbia University in 1940 under I.I. Rabi, focusing on molecular beams and magnetic resonance. During World War II, he contributed to radar and atomic bomb research at MIT’s Radiation Laboratory. Post-war, as a Harvard professor (1947–1986), he pioneered the Ramsey method of separated oscillatory fields, earning the 1989 Nobel Prize in Physics for enabling atomic clocks and quantum computing primitives. His 1950s–1960s work on quantum state engineering informed ASIC designs for tensor operations; Google’s TPU team drew on these principles for weight-stationary systolic arrays, reducing data movement akin to Ramsey’s coherence preservation. Ramsey advised early quantum hardware initiatives at Harvard and Los Alamos, influencing strategists in custom silicon for AI acceleration. He lived to 96, authoring over 250 papers and mentoring figures in computational physics.1,5

References

1. https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/tensor-processing-unit-TPU

2. https://builtin.com/articles/tensor-processing-unit-tpu

3. https://www.iterate.ai/ai-glossary/what-is-tpu-tensor-processing-unit

4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tensor_Processing_Unit

5. https://blog.bytebytego.com/p/how-googles-tensor-processing-unit

6. https://cloud.google.com/tpu

7. https://docs.cloud.google.com/tpu/docs/intro-to-tpu

8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKQz4-esU5M

9. https://lightning.ai/docs/pytorch/1.6.2/accelerators/tpu.html

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Quote: Ryan Dahl

Quote: Ryan Dahl

“This has been said a thousand times before, but allow me to add my own voice: the era of humans writing code is over. Disturbing for those of us who identify as SWEs, but no less true. That’s not to say SWEs don’t have work to do, but writing syntax directly is not it.” – Ryan Dahl – Nodejs creator

Ryan Dahl’s candid declaration captures a pivotal moment in software engineering, where artificial intelligence tools like Claude and Codex are reshaping the craft of coding. As the creator of Node.js and co-founder of Deno, Dahl speaks from the front lines of innovation, challenging software engineers (SWEs) to adapt to a future where manual syntax writing fades into obsolescence.

Who is Ryan Dahl?

Ryan Dahl is a pioneering figure in JavaScript runtime environments. In 2009, while a graduate student at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), he created Node.js, a revolutionary open-source, cross-platform runtime that brought JavaScript to server-side development. Node.js addressed key limitations of traditional server architectures by leveraging an event-driven, non-blocking I/O model, enabling scalable network applications. Its debut at the inaugural JSConf EU in 2009 sparked rapid adoption, powering giants like Netflix, Uber, and LinkedIn.1

By 2018, Dahl reflected critically on Node.js’s shortcomings for massive-scale servers, noting in interviews that alternatives like Go might suit such workloads better-a realisation that prompted his departure from heavy Node.js involvement.2 This introspection led to Deno’s launch in 2018, a modern runtime designed to fix Node.js pain points: it offers secure-by-default permissions, native TypeScript support, and bundled dependencies via URLs, eschewing Node’s npm-centric vulnerabilities. Today, as Deno’s CEO, Dahl continues advocating for JavaScript’s evolution, including efforts to challenge Oracle’s JavaScript trademark to free the term for generic use.1

Dahl’s career embodies pragmatic evolution. He views TypeScript-Microsoft’s typed superset of JavaScript-as the language’s future direction, predicting standards-level integration of types, though he respects Microsoft’s stewardship.1

Context of the Quote

Delivered via X (formerly Twitter), Dahl’s words respond to the explosive rise of AI coding assistants. Tools like Claude (Anthropic’s LLM) and Codex (OpenAI’s precursor to GPT models, powering GitHub Copilot) generate syntactically correct code from natural language prompts, rendering rote typing archaic. The quote acknowledges discomfort among SWEs-professionals who pride themselves on craftsmanship-yet insists the shift is inevitable. Dahl clarifies that engineering roles persist, evolving towards higher-level design, architecture, and oversight rather than syntax drudgery.

This aligns with Dahl’s history of bold pivots: from Node.js’s server-side breakthrough to Deno’s security-focused redesign, and now to AI’s paradigm shift. His voice carries weight amid 2020s AI hype, urging adaptation over denial.

Leading Theorists on AI and the Future of Coding

Dahl’s thesis echoes thinkers at the intersection of AI and software development:

  • Andrej Karpathy (ex-Tesla AI Director, OpenAI): In 2023, Karpathy declared ‘software 2.0’, where neural networks supplant traditional code, trained on data rather than hand-written logic. He predicts engineers will curate datasets and prompts, not lines of code.
  • Simon Willison (Datasette creator, LLM expert): Willison champions ‘vibe coding’-iterating via AI tools like Cursor or Aider-arguing syntax mastery becomes irrelevant as LLMs handle boilerplate flawlessly.
  • Swyx (Shawn Wang) (ex-Netflix, AI advocate): Popularised ‘Full-Stack AI Engineer’, a role blending prompting, evaluation, and integration skills over raw coding prowess.
  • Lex Fridman (MIT researcher, podcaster): Through dialogues with AI pioneers, Fridman explores how tools like Devin (Cognition Labs’ autonomous agent) could automate entire engineering workflows.

These voices build on earlier foundations: Alan Kay’s 1970s vision of personal computing democratised programming, now amplified by AI. Critics like Grady Booch warn of over-reliance, stressing human insight for complex systems, yet consensus grows that AI accelerates rote tasks, freeing creativity.

Implications for Software Engineering

Dahl’s provocation signals a renaissance: SWEs must master prompt engineering, AI evaluation, system design, and ethical oversight. Node.js’s legacy-empowering non-experts via JavaScript ubiquity-foreshadows AI’s democratisation. As Deno integrates AI-native features, Dahl positions himself at this frontier, inviting engineers to evolve or risk obsolescence.

 

References

1. https://redmonk.com/blog/2024/12/16/rmc-ryan-dahl-on-the-deno-v-oracle-petition/

2. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15767713

 

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Quote: Mark Carney

Quote: Mark Carney

“It seems that every day we’re reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules-based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can and the weak must suffer what they must.” – Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

Mark Carney’s invocation of Thucydides at the World Economic Forum represents far more than rhetorical flourish-it signals a fundamental recalibration of how middle powers must navigate an era of renewed great power competition. Delivered at Davos on 20 January 2026, the Canadian Prime Minister’s address articulates a doctrine of “value-based realism” that acknowledges the erosion of the post-Cold War international architecture whilst refusing to accept the fatalism such erosion might imply.

The Context: A World in Transition

Carney’s speech arrives at a pivotal moment in international affairs. The rules-based order that underpinned global stability since 1945-and particularly since the Cold War’s conclusion-faces unprecedented strain from great power rivalry, economic fragmentation, and the weaponisation of interdependence. The Canadian Prime Minister’s diagnosis is unflinching: the comfortable assumptions that geography and alliance membership automatically confer prosperity and security are no longer valid.1 This is not mere academic observation; it reflects lived experience across the Western alliance as traditional frameworks prove inadequate to contemporary challenges.

The quote itself draws directly from Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue, wherein the Athenian envoys declare that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” By invoking this ancient formulation, Carney grounds contemporary geopolitical anxiety in historical precedent, suggesting that the current moment represents not an aberration but a return to a more primal logic of international relations-one temporarily obscured by the post-1989 liberal consensus.

The Intellectual Foundations: Realism and Its Evolution

Carney’s framework draws upon several strands of international relations theory, most notably classical realism and its contemporary variants. The concept of “value-based realism,” which Carney attributes to Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, represents an attempt to synthesise realist analysis of power distribution with liberal commitments to human rights, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.1 This is a deliberate intellectual move-rejecting both naive multilateralism and amoral power politics in favour of a pragmatic middle path.

Classical realism, articulated most influentially by Hans Morgenthau in the mid-twentieth century, posits that states are rational actors pursuing power within an anarchic international system. Morgenthau’s seminal work Politics Among Nations established that national interest, defined in terms of power, constitutes the objective of statecraft. Yet Morgenthau himself recognised that power encompasses more than military capacity-it includes economic strength, technological capability, and moral authority. Carney’s approach resurrects this more nuanced understanding, arguing that middle powers possess distinct forms of leverage beyond military might.

The realist tradition has evolved considerably since Morgenthau. Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism emphasised the anarchic nature of the international system and the security dilemma it generates, wherein defensive measures by one state appear threatening to others, creating spirals of mistrust. This framework helps explain contemporary great power competition: as American hegemony faces challenge from rising powers, each actor rationally pursues security through military buildups and alliance formation, inadvertently triggering the very insecurity it seeks to prevent. Carney’s diagnosis aligns with this logic-the “end of the rules-based order” reflects not malice but the structural pressures inherent in multipolarity.

More recent theorists have grappled with how middle powers navigate such environments. Scholars such as Andrew Pratt and Fen Osler Hampton have examined “middle power diplomacy,” arguing that states lacking superpower status can exercise disproportionate influence through coalition-building, norm entrepreneurship, and strategic positioning. This intellectual tradition directly informs Carney’s prescription: middle powers must act together, creating what he terms “a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture” upon which they can draw for future challenges.1

The Diagnosis: Structural Transformation

Carney’s analysis identifies three interconnected phenomena reshaping the international landscape. First, the erosion of the rules-based order reflects genuine shifts in material power distribution. The post-Cold War moment, characterised by American unipolarity and the apparent triumph of liberal democracy, has given way to multipolarity and ideological contestation. Great powers-whether the United States, China, or Russia-increasingly view international institutions and agreements as constraints on their freedom of action rather than frameworks for mutual benefit.

Second, economic interdependence, once theorised as a force for peace, has become weaponised. Sanctions regimes, technology restrictions, and supply chain manipulation now constitute standard instruments of statecraft. This transformation reflects what scholars term the “securitisation” of economics-the process whereby economic relationships become framed through security logics. Carney explicitly warns against this: middle powers must resist the temptation to accept “economic intimidation” from one direction whilst remaining silent about it from another, lest they signal weakness and invite further coercion.1

Third, the traditional alliance structures that provided security guarantees to middle powers have become less reliable. NATO’s continued existence notwithstanding, the United States under various administrations has questioned its commitment to collective defence, whilst simultaneously pursuing unilateral policies (such as tariff regimes) that undermine allied interests. This creates what Carney identifies as a fundamental strategic problem: bilateral negotiation between a middle power and a hegemon occurs from a position of weakness, forcing accommodation and competitive deference.1

The Intellectual Lineage: From Thucydides to Contemporary Geopolitics

Carney’s invocation of Thucydides connects to a broader contemporary discourse on great power competition. Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” thesis-the proposition that conflict between a rising power and a declining hegemon is structurally likely-has become influential in policy circles. Allison argues that of sixteen historical cases where a rising power challenged a ruling one, twelve ended in war. This framework, whilst contested by scholars who emphasise contingency and agency, captures genuine anxieties about Sino-American relations and broader multipolarity.

Yet Carney’s deployment of Thucydides differs subtly from Allison’s. Rather than accepting the Trap as inevitable, Carney uses the ancient formulation to establish a baseline-the world as it actually is, stripped of comforting illusions-from which alternative paths become possible. This reflects what might be termed “tragic realism”: an acknowledgment of structural constraints coupled with insistence on human agency and moral choice.

Contemporary theorists of middle power strategy have developed frameworks relevant to Carney’s prescription. Scholars such as Amitav Acharya have examined how middle powers can exercise “agency” within structural constraints through what he terms “norm localisation”-adapting global norms to regional contexts and thereby shaping international discourse. Similarly, theorists of “minilateral” cooperation-agreements among smaller groups of like-minded states-provide intellectual scaffolding for Carney’s vision of issue-specific coalitions rather than universal institutions.

The Prescription: Strategic Autonomy and Collective Action

Carney’s response to this diagnosis comprises several elements. First, building domestic strength: Canada is cutting taxes, removing interprovincial trade barriers, investing a trillion dollars in energy, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals, and doubling defence spending by decade’s end.1 This reflects a classical realist insight-that international influence ultimately rests upon domestic capacity. A state cannot punch above its weight indefinitely; sustainable influence requires genuine economic and military capability.

Second, strategic autonomy: rather than accepting subordination to any hegemon, middle powers must calibrate relationships so their depth reflects shared values.1 This requires what Carney terms “honesty about the world as it is”-recognising that some relationships will be transactional, others deeper, depending on alignment of interests and values. It also requires consistency: applying the same standards to allies and rivals, thereby avoiding the appearance of weakness or double standards that invites further coercion.

Third, coalition-building: Carney proposes plurilateral arrangements-bridging the Trans-Pacific Partnership and European Union to create a trading bloc of 1.5 billion people, forming buyers’ clubs for critical minerals anchored in the G7, cooperating with democracies on artificial intelligence governance.1 These initiatives reflect what might be termed “competitive multilateralism”-creating alternative institutional frameworks that function as described, rather than relying on existing institutions that have become gridlocked or captured by great powers.

This approach draws upon theoretical work on institutional design and coalition formation. Scholars such as Barbara Koremenos have examined how states choose institutional forms-examining when they prefer bilateral arrangements, multilateral institutions, or minilateral coalitions. Carney’s framework suggests that in an era of great power rivalry, minilateral coalitions organised around specific issues prove more effective than universal institutions, precisely because they exclude actors whose interests diverge fundamentally.

The Philosophical Underpinning: Beyond Nostalgia

Carney’s most provocative claim may be his insistence that “nostalgia is not a strategy.”1 This rejects a tempting response to the erosion of the post-Cold War order: attempting to restore it through diplomatic pressure or institutional reform. Instead, Carney argues, middle powers must accept that “the old order is not coming back” and focus on building “something bigger, better, stronger, more just” from the fracture.1

This reflects a philosophical stance sometimes termed “constructive realism”-accepting structural constraints whilst refusing to accept that they determine outcomes. It echoes the existentialist insight that humans are “condemned to be free,” forced to choose even within constraining circumstances. For middle powers, this means accepting that great power rivalry is real and structural, yet refusing to accept that this reality precludes agency, moral choice, or the possibility of building alternative arrangements.

The intellectual roots of this position extend to theorists of social construction in international relations, particularly Alexander Wendt’s argument that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Whilst the anarchic structure of the international system is given, the meaning states attribute to it-whether it necessitates conflict or permits cooperation-remains contestable. Carney’s vision assumes that middle powers, acting together, can construct a different meaning of multipolarity: not a return to Hobbesian warfare but a framework of genuine cooperation among states that share sufficient common ground.

Contemporary Relevance: The Middle Power Moment

Carney’s address arrives at a moment when middle power agency has become increasingly salient. The traditional Cold War binary-alignment with either superpower-has dissolved, creating space for states to pursue more autonomous strategies. Countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and the European Union member states increasingly resist pressure to choose sides in great power competition, instead pursuing what scholars term “strategic autonomy” or “non-alignment 2.0.”

Yet Carney’s formulation differs from classical non-alignment. Rather than attempting to remain neutral between competing blocs, he proposes active coalition-building among states that share values-democracy, human rights, rule of law-whilst remaining pragmatic about interests. This reflects what might be termed “values-based coalition-building,” distinguishing it both from amoral realpolitik and from idealistic universalism.

The stakes Carney identifies are genuine. In a world of great power fortresses-blocs organised around competing powers with limited cross-bloc exchange-middle powers face subordination or marginalisation. Conversely, in a world of genuine cooperation among willing partners, middle powers can exercise disproportionate influence through coalition-building and norm entrepreneurship. Carney’s challenge to middle powers is thus existential: act together or accept subordination.

This framing resonates with contemporary scholarship on the future of international order. Scholars such as Hal Brands and Michael Beckley have examined whether the liberal international order can be reformed or whether it will fragment into competing blocs. Carney’s implicit answer is that the outcome remains undetermined-it depends on choices made by middle powers in the coming years. This is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but genuinely open-ended, contingent upon agency.

The Broader Implications

Carney’s Davos address represents more than Canadian foreign policy positioning. It articulates a vision of international order that acknowledges structural realities-great power rivalry, the erosion of universal institutions, the weaponisation of economic interdependence-whilst refusing to accept that these realities preclude alternatives to hegemonic subordination or great power conflict. For middle powers, this vision offers both diagnosis and prescription: the world has changed fundamentally, but middle powers retain agency if they act together with strategic clarity and moral consistency.

The intellectual traditions informing this vision-classical and structural realism, middle power diplomacy theory, constructivist international relations scholarship-converge on a common insight: international order is not simply imposed by the powerful but constructed through the choices and actions of all states. In an era of multipolarity and great power rivalry, this construction becomes more difficult but also more consequential. The question Carney poses to middle powers is whether they will accept the role assigned to them by great power competition or whether they will actively construct an alternative.

References

1. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miM4ur5WH3Y

3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btqHDhO4h10

4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjpjEoJkUes

5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxXsXXT1Dto

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Quote: Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

Quote: Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

“It is time for companies and countries to take their signs down… You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.” – Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

In his special address at the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting 2026 in Davos, delivered on 20 January 2026, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney issued a stark warning about the collapse of the rules-based international order. The quote captures Carney’s pivot towards ‘value-based realism,’ urging nations to abandon naive assumptions of automatic prosperity through globalisation and instead prioritise strategic autonomy, domestic strength, and recalibrated alliances.3,5

Mark Carney: From Central Banker to Prime Minister

Mark Joseph Carney, born on 16 March 1965, is a Canadian economist and politician serving as Canada’s 24th Prime Minister since March 2025. Elected leader of the Liberal Party with over 85.9% of the vote on 9 March 2025, Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister on 14 March without prior elected office, a first in Canadian history. He represents Nepean in Parliament and led the Liberals to a minority government in the subsequent election.1,2

Carney’s career trajectory is marked by high-profile roles in global finance. He served as Governor of the Bank of Canada from 2008 to 2013 and then as Governor of the Bank of England from 2013 to 2020, becoming the first non-Briton in that position. Post-governorship, he advised Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on COVID-19 economic responses and chaired the Liberal Party’s Task Force on Economic Growth in 2024. Ideologically a centrist technocrat and ‘Blue Grit Liberal,’ Carney’s premiership has focused on economic resilience amid geopolitical tensions.2

Since taking office, Carney has enacted transformative policies: repealing the federal consumer carbon tax, passing the One Canadian Economy Act to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers, fast-tracking a trillion dollars in investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, and infrastructure, and doubling defence spending by decade’s end. His government has recognised the State of Palestine, improved ties with China-including a January 2026 visit yielding tariff reductions on canola and electric vehicles-and sustained support for Ukraine.2,3,4

Context of the Quote: Davos 2026 and Canada’s Strategic Shift

Carney’s address came amid an escalating trade war with the United States and the erosion of post-Cold War globalisation. He declared the end of comfortable assumptions that geography and alliances guaranteed security and prosperity, advocating engagement ‘with open eyes’ and relationships calibrated to shared values. Canada, he noted, was among the first to heed this ‘wake-up call,’ shifting to build strength at home while inviting middle powers to join in ‘value-based realism’-a term borrowed from Finland’s President Alexander Stubb.3

The speech highlighted domestic actions like tax cuts on incomes, capital gains, and business investment, alongside broad engagement to maximise influence in a fluid world. Carney received a standing ovation, underscoring the resonance of his message on naming ‘reality’ and acting decisively.2,3

Leading Theorists on Globalisation, Integration, and Subordination

Carney’s critique echoes longstanding debates in international relations and economics on the limits of globalisation. Key theorists provide intellectual foundations for his views:

  • Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (Regime Theory): In Power and Interdependence (1977), they argued that complex interdependence fosters mutual benefits through institutions, but power asymmetries can lead to subordination. Carney’s call to ‘take down signs’ of mutual benefit aligns with their recognition that regimes falter when great powers exploit them.2
  • Graham Allison (Thucydides Trap): Allison’s 2017 book warns of inevitable conflict when a rising power (e.g., China) threatens a ruling one (e.g., US), fracturing integration. Carney’s emphasis on strategic autonomy mirrors Allison’s advice for middle powers to hedge amid US-China rivalry.3
  • Dani Rodrik (Trilemma of Global Economy): Rodrik posits governments cannot simultaneously pursue hyper-globalisation, national sovereignty, and democracy. Carney’s policies-relaxing regulations, boosting defence, and diversifying trade-reflect choosing sovereignty over unchecked integration.2
  • John Mearsheimer (Offensive Realism): In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer contends states maximise power in anarchy, rendering mutual benefit illusory when subordination looms. Carney’s ‘honesty about the world as it is’ evokes this realist turn from liberal optimism.3
  • Alexander Stubb (Value-Based Realism): As Finland’s President, Stubb popularised the term Carney invokes, blending realism with values like human rights. This framework guides Carney’s calibrated engagements, such as the China partnership focused on trade without ideological naivety.3

These thinkers collectively underscore Carney’s thesis: integration’s promise of mutual benefit dissolves when it enables dominance, necessitating realism over idealism in trade and alliances.

References

1. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/about

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Carney

3. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

4. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/01/16/prime-minister-carney-forges-new-strategic-partnership-peoples

5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miM4ur5WH3Y

6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qIUrFANCvU

7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QBT5fR-DY

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Quote: Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

Quote: Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

“We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn’t mourn it; nostalgia is not a strategy. But we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, and more just.” – Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

Mark Carney’s address at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 20 January 2026 articulated a philosophical pivot that extends far beyond Canadian policy. His assertion that “the old order is not coming back” represents a candid acknowledgement of the structural transformation reshaping international relations-a transformation that demands not nostalgic resistance but strategic innovation. The quote encapsulates a broader intellectual movement among contemporary policymakers who recognise that the post-Cold War consensus, built on rules-based multilateralism and assumed Western dominance, has fundamentally fractured.

The Context of Carney’s Intervention

Carney delivered this address as Canada’s 24th Prime Minister, having assumed office in March 2025 following his election as Liberal Party leader with an unprecedented 85.9% of the vote on the first ballot. His ascension marked a significant departure in Canadian political history: he became the first Canadian Prime Minister never to have held elected office before assuming the premiership. This unconventional trajectory-from central banking to the highest political office-reflects the technocratic orientation increasingly evident in responses to complex geopolitical challenges.

The timing of Carney’s Davos intervention proved strategically significant. His address came mere days after a high-profile visit to Beijing, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and negotiated a “new strategic partnership” that substantially reduced tariffs on Canadian canola oil (from 85% to 15%) and Chinese electric vehicles (from 100% to 6.1%). This diplomatic manoeuvre exemplified the very philosophy he articulated at Davos: rather than lamenting the erosion of Western-led institutional frameworks, Canada was actively recalibrating its relationships to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities.

The Intellectual Architecture: Value-Based Realism

Carney’s formulation draws explicitly on what he termed “value-based realism,” a concept articulated by Alexander Stubb, President of Finland. This framework represents a deliberate synthesis of two traditionally opposed analytical traditions: the idealist commitment to universal values (human rights, sovereignty, democratic governance) and the realist acknowledgement of power dynamics and national interest. Rather than treating these as contradictory, value-based realism posits that nations can maintain principled commitments whilst simultaneously engaging pragmatically with the world as it exists rather than as they wish it to be.

This intellectual positioning reflects broader currents in contemporary international relations theory. The concept challenges what scholars term “liberal internationalism”-the post-1945 consensus that institutionalised rules, multilateral organisations, and shared norms could transcend power politics. Carney’s acknowledgement that “the old comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security” no longer hold valid represents a significant concession to structural realist arguments that have long emphasised the primacy of material capabilities and strategic positioning over institutional arrangements.

Leading Theorists and Intellectual Foundations

Structural Realism and the Multipolar Transition: Carney’s analysis aligns substantially with structural realist scholarship, particularly the work of scholars examining the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Theorists such as John Mearsheimer have long argued that the post-Cold War unipolar moment was inherently unstable and that the rise of peer competitors (particularly China) would inevitably erode the institutional frameworks built during American hegemony. Carney’s acknowledgement that “the powerful have their power” whilst Canada must “build our strength at home” reflects this realist recognition that material capabilities ultimately determine strategic options.

Strategic Autonomy and Middle Power Theory: Carney explicitly positioned Canada as a “middle power” capable of exercising disproportionate influence through strategic positioning. This concept draws on middle power theory, developed by scholars including Andrew Cooper and Evan Potter, which argues that states occupying the intermediate tier of the international system can leverage their geographic position, institutional expertise, and coalition-building capacity to exercise influence beyond their material weight. Carney’s emphasis on “building strategic autonomy whilst maintaining values” reflects this theoretical framework-middle powers must avoid dependency on great power patrons whilst retaining the principled commitments that differentiate them from purely transactional actors.

The Fracture Metaphor and Institutional Decay: Carney’s use of “fracture” rather than “collapse” or “transformation” carries theoretical significance. This language echoes the work of scholars examining institutional erosion, particularly those studying the decline of post-war multilateral organisations. Theorists including Dani Rodrik have documented how globalisation and geopolitical competition have strained the institutional consensus that underpinned the Bretton Woods system and its successors. The fracture metaphor suggests not apocalyptic breakdown but rather the splintering of previously unified frameworks into competing regional and bilateral arrangements.

Constructivist Approaches to Order-Building: Carney’s assertion that “from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, and more just” reflects constructivist international relations theory, which emphasises that international orders are socially constructed rather than determined by material forces alone. Scholars including Alexander Wendt have argued that actors can reshape international structures through strategic communication and norm entrepreneurship. Carney’s framing positions Canada not as a passive victim of systemic change but as an active participant in constructing new institutional arrangements-a distinctly constructivist orientation.

The Rejection of Nostalgia as Strategic Doctrine

Carney’s explicit rejection of nostalgia as a strategic framework warrants particular attention. This formulation directly challenges what scholars term “nostalgic nationalism”-the tendency of declining powers to seek restoration of previous hierarchies rather than adaptation to new circumstances. The statement “nostalgia is not a strategy” functions as both intellectual critique and practical warning. It implicitly critiques both American efforts to reassert unilateral dominance and European attempts to preserve Cold War alliance structures unchanged.

This positioning reflects contemporary debates within strategic studies about how established powers should respond to relative decline. Scholars including Hal Brands have examined whether declining powers typically pursue accommodation or confrontation; Carney’s framework suggests a third path: strategic recalibration that preserves core values whilst abandoning outdated institutional assumptions.

Domestic Foundations: Building Strength at Home

Carney’s emphasis on building “strength at home” through tax reductions, removal of interprovincial trade barriers, and a trillion-dollar investment programme in energy, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals reflects economic nationalism tempered by liberal institutional commitments. This approach synthesises elements of developmental state theory (the strategic deployment of state capacity to build competitive advantage) with market-liberal principles. The doubling of defence spending by decade’s end, coupled with investments in domestic industrial capacity, reflects what scholars term “strategic decoupling”-the deliberate reduction of dependency on potentially unreliable partners through domestic capability development.

This domestic orientation also reflects recognition of what political economists call the “trilemma of globalisation”: the impossibility of simultaneously maintaining democratic sovereignty, deep economic integration, and fixed exchange rates. By prioritising sovereignty and strategic autonomy, Carney’s government implicitly accepts reduced integration with some partners whilst deepening selective relationships (notably with China) where mutual benefit is demonstrable.

The Broader Geopolitical Significance

Carney’s Davos address arrived at a moment of acute geopolitical tension. The ongoing trade conflict with the United States, the continuation of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the intensifying competition for technological and resource dominance between Western and Chinese-led blocs have created what scholars term a “multiplex world order”-one characterised by simultaneous cooperation and competition across multiple domains rather than simple bipolarity or unipolarity.

His reception-described as earning “a rare standing ovation” at Davos-suggests that his articulation of value-based realism resonated with an international audience of business and political leaders grappling with similar strategic dilemmas. The framework offers intellectual legitimacy for the pragmatic recalibration that many middle and smaller powers have already undertaken, whilst maintaining rhetorical commitment to universal principles.

Implications for International Order-Building

Carney’s vision of building “something bigger, better, stronger, and more just” from the fracture of the old order represents an optimistic but contingent proposition. It assumes that the emerging multipolar system need not replicate the zero-sum competition that characterised earlier multipolar eras, and that institutional innovation can accommodate both great power competition and cooperative problem-solving on transnational challenges.

This optimism reflects what scholars call “liberal institutionalism”-the belief that even in anarchic international systems, institutions can facilitate cooperation and reduce transaction costs. Yet Carney’s framework differs from earlier liberal institutionalism in its explicit acknowledgement that such institutions must reflect contemporary power distributions rather than attempting to preserve outdated hierarchies. The Canada-China strategic partnership, with its focus on trade, energy, and technology, exemplifies this approach: cooperation structured around mutual benefit rather than ideological alignment or institutional obligation.

The intellectual coherence of Carney’s position lies in its rejection of false dichotomies. It refuses the choice between principled commitment and pragmatic engagement, between national interest and international cooperation, between acknowledging systemic change and working to shape its trajectory. Whether this framework can sustain itself amid intensifying great power competition remains an open question-one that will substantially determine the character of the emerging international order.

References

1. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

2. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/about

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Carney

4. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/01/16/prime-minister-carney-forges-new-strategic-partnership-peoples

5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miM4ur5WH3Y

6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qIUrFANCvU

7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QBT5fR-DY

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Term: Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE)

Term: Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE)

“An AI Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE) is a technical expert embedded directly within a client’s environment to implement, customise, and operationalize complex AI/ML products, acting as a bridge between core engineering and customer needs.” – Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE)

Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE)

A Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE) is a highly skilled technical specialist embedded directly within a client’s environment to implement, customise, deploy, and operationalise complex software or AI/ML products, serving as a critical bridge between core engineering teams and customer-specific needs.1,2,5 This hands-on, customer-facing role combines software engineering, solution architecture, and technical consulting to translate business workflows into production-ready solutions, often involving rapid prototyping, integrations with legacy systems (e.g., CRMs, ERPs, HRIS), and troubleshooting in real-world settings.1,2,3

Key Responsibilities

  • Collaborate directly with enterprise customers to understand workflows, scope use cases, and design tailored AI agent or GenAI solutions.1,3,5
  • Lead deployment, integration, and configuration in diverse environments (cloud, on-prem, hybrid), including APIs, OAuth, webhooks, and production-grade interfaces.1,2,4
  • Build end-to-end workflows, operationalise LLM/SLM-based systems (e.g., RAG, vector search, multi-agent orchestration), and iterate for scalability, performance, and user adoption.1,5,6
  • Act as a liaison to product/engineering teams, feeding back insights, proposing features, and influencing roadmaps while conducting workshops, audits, and go-lives.1,3,7
  • Debug live issues, document implementations, and ensure compliance with IT/security requirements like data residency and logging.1,2

Essential Skills and Qualifications

  • Technical Expertise: Proficiency in Python, Node.js, or Java; cloud platforms (AWS, Azure, GCP); REST APIs; and GenAI tools (e.g., LangChain, HuggingFace, DSPy).1,6
  • AI/ML Fluency: Experience with LLMs, agentic workflows, fine-tuning, Text2SQL, and evaluation/optimisation for production.5,6,7
  • Soft Skills: Strong communication for executive presentations, problem-solving in ambiguous settings, and willingness for international travel (e.g., US/Europe).1,2
  • Experience: Typically 10+ years in enterprise software, with exposure to domains like healthcare, finance, or customer service; startup or consulting background preferred.1,7

FDEs differ from traditional support or sales engineering roles by writing production code, owning outcomes like a “hands-on AI startup CTO,” and enabling scalable AI delivery in complex enterprises.2,5,7 In the AI era, they excel as architects of agentic operations, leveraging AI for diagnostics, automation, and pattern identification to accelerate value realisation.7

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Clayton Christensen

The concept of the Forward Deployed Engineer aligns most closely with Clayton Christensen (1947–2020), the Harvard Business School professor renowned for pioneering disruptive innovation theory, which emphasises how customer-embedded adaptation drives technology adoption and market disruption—mirroring the FDE’s role in customising complex AI products for real-world fit.2,7

Biography and Backstory: Born in Salt Lake City, Utah, Christensen earned a BA in economics from Brigham Young University, an MPhil from Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, and a DBA from Harvard. After consulting at BCG and founding Innosight, he joined Harvard faculty in 1992, authoring seminal works like The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997), which argued that incumbents fail by ignoring “disruptive” technologies that initially underperform but evolve to dominate via iterative, customer-proximate improvements.8 His theories stemmed from studying disk drives and steel minimills, revealing how “listening to customers” in sustained innovation traps firms, while forward-deployed experimentation in niche contexts enables breakthroughs.

Relationship to FDE: Christensen’s framework directly informs the FDE model, popularised by Palantir (inspired by military “forward deployment”) and scaled in AI firms like Scale AI and Databricks.5,6 FDEs embody disruptive deployment: embedded in client environments, they prototype and iterate solutions (e.g., GenAI agents) that bypass headquarters silos, much like disruptors refine products through “jobs to be done” in ambiguous, high-stakes settings.2,5,7 Christensen advised Palantir-like enterprises on scaling via such roles, stressing that technical experts “forward-deployed” accelerate value by solving unspoken problems—echoing FDE skills in rapid problem identification and agentic orchestration.7 His later work on AI ethics and enterprise transformation (e.g., Competing Against Luck, 2016) underscores FDEs’ strategic pivot: turning customer feedback into product evolution, ensuring AI scales disruptively rather than generically.1,3

References

1. https://avaamo.ai/forward-deployed-engineer/

2. https://futurense.com/blog/fde-forward-deployed-engineers

3. https://theloops.io/career/forward-deployed-ai-engineer/

4. https://scale.com/careers/4593571005

5. https://jobs.lever.co/palantir/636fc05c-d348-4a06-be51-597cb9e07488

6. https://www.databricks.com/company/careers/professional-services-operations/ai-engineer—fde-forward-deployed-engineer-8024010002

7. https://www.rocketlane.com/blogs/forward-deployed-engineer

8. https://thomasotter.substack.com/p/wtf-is-a-forward-deployed-engineer

9. https://www.salesforce.com/blog/forward-deployed-engineer/

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Quote: Andre Karpathy

Quote: Andre Karpathy

“I’ve never felt this much behind as a programmer. The profession is being dramatically refactored as the bits contributed by the programmer are increasingly sparse and between. I have a sense that I could be 10X more powerful.” – Andre Karpathy – AI guru

Andre Karpathy, a pioneering AI researcher, captures the profound disruption AI is bringing to programming in this quote: “I’ve never felt this much behind as a programmer. The profession is being dramatically refactored as the bits contributed by the programmer are increasingly sparse and between. I have a sense that I could be 10X more powerful.”1,2 Delivered amid his reflections on AI’s rapid evolution, it underscores his personal sense of urgency as tools like large language models (LLMs) redefine developers’ roles from code writers to orchestrators of intelligent systems.2

Context of the Quote

Karpathy shared this introspection as part of his broader commentary on the programming profession’s transformation, likely tied to his June 17, 2025, keynote at AI Startup School in San Francisco titled “Software Is Changing (Again).”4 In it, he outlined Software 3.0—a paradigm where LLMs enable natural language as the primary programming interface, allowing AI to generate code, design systems, and even self-improve with minimal human input.1,4,5 The quote reflects his firsthand experience: traditional Software 1.0 (handwritten code) and Software 2.0 (neural networks trained on data) are giving way to 3.0, where programmers contribute “sparse” high-level guidance amid AI-generated code, evoking a feeling of both lag and untapped potential.1,2 He likens developers to “virtual managers” overseeing AI collaborators, focusing on architecture, decomposition, and ethics rather than syntax.2 This shift mirrors historical leaps—like from machine code to high-level languages—but accelerates via tools like GitHub Copilot, making elite programmers those who master prompt engineering and human-AI loops.2,4

Backstory on Andre Karpathy

Born in Slovakia and raised in Canada, Andrej Karpathy earned his PhD in computer vision at Stanford University, where he architected and led CS231n, the first deep learning course there, now one of Stanford’s most popular.3 A founding member of OpenAI, he advanced generative models and reinforcement learning. At Tesla (2017–2022), as Senior Director of AI, he led Autopilot vision, data labeling, neural net training, and deployment on custom inference chips, pushing toward Full Self-Driving.3,4 Briefly involved in Tesla Optimus, he left to found Eureka Labs, modernizing education with AI.3 Known as an “AI guru” for viral lectures like “The spelled-out intro to neural networks” and zero-to-hero LLM courses, Karpathy embodies the transition to Software 3.0, having deleted C++ code in favor of growing neural nets at Tesla.3,4

Leading Theorists on Software Paradigms and AI-Driven Programming

Karpathy’s framework builds on foundational ideas from deep learning pioneers. Key figures include:

  • Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton (the “Godfathers of AI”): Their 2010s work on deep neural networks birthed Software 2.0, where optimization on massive datasets replaces explicit programming. LeCun (Meta AI chief) pioneered convolutional nets; Bengio advanced sequence models; Hinton coined “backpropagation.” Their Turing Awards (2018) validated data-driven learning, enabling Karpathy’s Tesla-scale deployments.1

  • Ian Goodfellow (GAN inventor, 2014): His Generative Adversarial Networks prefigured Software 3.0’s generative capabilities, where AI creates code and data autonomously, blurring human-AI creation boundaries.1

  • Andrej Karpathy himself: Extends these into Software 3.0, emphasizing recursive self-improvement (AI writing AI) and “vibe coding” via natural language, as in his 2025 talks.1,4

  • Related influencers: Fei-Fei Li (Stanford, co-creator of ImageNet) scaled vision datasets fueling Software 2.0; Ilya Sutskever (OpenAI co-founder) drove LLMs like GPT, powering 3.0’s code synthesis.3

This evolution demands programmers adapt: curricula must prioritize AI collaboration over syntax, with humans excelling in judgment and oversight amid accelerating abstraction.1,2

References

1. https://inferencebysequoia.substack.com/p/andrej-karpathys-software-30-and

2. https://ytosko.dev/blog/andrej-karpathy-reflects-on-ais-impact-on-programming-profession

3. https://karpathy.ai

4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCEmiRjPEtQ

5. https://www.cio.com/article/4085335/the-future-of-programming-and-the-new-role-of-the-programmer-in-the-ai-era.html

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Term: Davos

Term: Davos

“Davos refers to the annual, invitation-only meeting of global political, business, academic, and civil society leaders held every January in the Swiss Alpine town of Davos-Klosters. It acts as a premier, high-profile platform for discussing pressing global economic, social, and political issues.” – Davos

Davos represents far more than a simple annual conference; it embodies a transformative model of global governance and problem-solving that has evolved significantly since its inception. Held each January in the Swiss Alpine resort town of Davos-Klosters, this invitation-only gathering convenes over 2,500 leaders spanning business, government, civil society, academia, and media to address humanity’s most pressing challenges.1,7

The Evolution and Purpose of Davos

Founded in 1971 by German engineer Klaus Schwab as the European Management Symposium, Davos emerged from a singular vision: that businesses should serve all stakeholders-employees, suppliers, communities, and the broader society-rather than shareholders alone.1 This foundational concept, known as stakeholder theory, remains central to the World Economic Forum’s mission today.1 The organisation formalised this philosophy through the Davos Manifesto in 1973, which was substantially renewed in 2020 to address the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.1,3

The Forum’s evolution reflects a fundamental shift in how global problems are addressed. Rather than relying solely on traditional nation-state institutions established after the Second World War-such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United Nations-Davos pioneered what scholars term a “Networked Institution.”2 This model brings together independent parties from civil society, the private sector, government, and individual stakeholders who perceive shared global problems and coordinate their activities to make progress, rather than working competitively in isolation.2

Tangible Impact and Policy Outcomes

Davos has demonstrated concrete influence on global affairs. In 1988, Greece and Türkiye averted armed conflict through an agreement finalised at the meeting.1 The 1990s witnessed a historic handshake that helped end apartheid in South Africa, and the platform served as the venue for announcing the UN Global Compact, calling on companies to align operations with human rights principles.1 More recently, in 2023, the United States announced a new development fund programme at Davos, and global CEOs agreed to support a free trade agreement in Africa.1 The Forum also launched Gavi, the vaccine alliance, in 2000-an initiative that now helps vaccinate nearly half the world’s children and played a crucial role in delivering COVID-19 vaccines to vulnerable countries.6

The Davos Manifesto and Stakeholder Capitalism

The 2020 Davos Manifesto formally established that the World Economic Forum is guided by stakeholder capitalism, a concept positing that corporations should deliver value not only to shareholders but to all stakeholders, including employees, society, and the planet.3 This framework commits businesses to three interconnected responsibilities:

  • Acting as stewards of the environmental and material universe for future generations, protecting the biosphere and championing a circular, shared, and regenerative economy5
  • Responsibly managing near-term, medium-term, and long-term value creation in pursuit of sustainable shareholder returns that do not sacrifice the future for the present5
  • Fulfilling human and societal aspirations as part of the broader social system, measuring performance not only on shareholder returns but also on environmental, social, and governance objectives5

Contemporary Relevance and Structure

The World Economic Forum operates as an international not-for-profit organisation headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, with formal institutional status granted by the Swiss government.2,3 Its mission is to improve the state of the world through public-private cooperation, guided by core values of integrity, impartiality, independence, respect, and excellence.8 The Forum addresses five interconnected global challenges: Growth, Geopolitics, Technology, People, and Planet.8

Davos functions as the touchstone event within the Forum’s year-round orchestration of leaders from civil society, business, and government.2 Beyond the annual meeting, the organisation maintains continuous engagement through year-round communities spanning industries, regions, and generations, transforming ideas into action through initiatives and dialogues.4 The 2026 meeting, themed “A Spirit Of Dialogue,” emphasises advancing cooperation to address global issues, exploring the impact of innovation and emerging technologies, and promoting inclusive, sustainable approaches to human capital development.7

Klaus Schwab: The Architect of Davos

Klaus Schwab (born 1938) stands as the visionary founder and defining intellectual force behind Davos and the World Economic Forum. A German engineer and economist educated at the University of Bern and Harvard Business School, Schwab possessed an unusual conviction: that business leaders bore responsibility not merely to shareholders but to society writ large. This belief, radical for the early 1970s, crystallised into the founding of the European Management Symposium in 1971.

Schwab’s relationship with Davos transcends institutional leadership; he fundamentally shaped its philosophical architecture. His stakeholder theory challenged the prevailing shareholder primacy model that dominated Western capitalism, proposing instead that corporations exist within complex ecosystems of interdependence. This vision proved prescient, gaining mainstream acceptance only decades later as environmental concerns, social inequality, and governance failures exposed the limitations of pure shareholder capitalism.

Beyond founding the Forum, Schwab authored influential works including “The Fourth Industrial Revolution” (2016), a concept he coined to describe the convergence of digital, biological, and physical technologies reshaping society.1 His intellectual contributions extended the Forum’s reach from a business conference into a comprehensive platform addressing geopolitical tensions, technological disruption, and societal transformation. Schwab’s personal diplomacy-his ability to convene adversaries and facilitate dialogue-became embedded in Davos’s culture, establishing it as a neutral space where competitors and rivals could engage constructively.

Schwab’s legacy reflects a particular European sensibility: the belief that enlightened capitalism, properly structured around stakeholder interests, could serve as a force for global stability and progress. Whether one views this as visionary or naïve, his influence on contemporary governance models and corporate responsibility frameworks remains substantial. The expansion of Davos from a modest gathering of European executives to a global institution addressing humanity’s most complex challenges represents perhaps the most tangible measure of Schwab’s impact on twenty-first-century global affairs.

References

1. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/12/davos-annual-meeting-everything-you-need-to-know/

2. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2016/01/the-meaning-of-davos/

3. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-davos-and-the-world-economic-forum

4. https://www.weforum.org/about/who-we-are/

5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Economic_Forum

6. https://www.zurich.com/media/magazine/2022/what-is-davos-your-guide-to-the-world-economic-forums-annual-meeting

7. https://www.oliverwyman.com/our-expertise/events/world-economic-forum-davos.html

8. https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum/

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Term: Language Processing Unit (LPU)

Term: Language Processing Unit (LPU)

“A Language Processing Unit (LPU) is a specialized processor designed specifically to accelerate tasks related to natural language processing (NLP) and the inference of large language models (LLMs). It is a purpose-built chip engineered to handle the unique demands of language tasks.” – Language Processing Unit (LPU)

A Language Processing Unit (LPU) is a specialised processor purpose-built to accelerate natural language processing (NLP) tasks, particularly the inference phase of large language models (LLMs), by optimising sequential data handling and memory bandwidth utilisation.1,2,3,4

Core Definition and Purpose

LPUs address the unique computational demands of language-based AI workloads, which involve sequential processing of text data—such as tokenisation, attention mechanisms, sequence modelling, and context handling—rather than the parallel computations suited to graphics processing units (GPUs).1,4,6 Unlike general-purpose CPUs (flexible but slow for deep learning) or GPUs (excellent for matrix operations and training but inefficient for NLP inference), LPUs prioritise low-latency, high-throughput inference for pre-trained LLMs, achieving up to 10x greater energy efficiency and substantially faster speeds.3,6

Key differentiators include:

  • Sequential optimisation: Designed for transformer-based models where data flows predictably, unlike GPUs’ parallel “hub-and-spoke” model that incurs data paging overhead.1,3,4
  • Deterministic execution: Every clock cycle is predictable, eliminating resource contention for compute and bandwidth.3
  • High scalability: Supports seamless chip-to-chip data “conveyor belts” without routers, enabling near-perfect scaling in multi-device systems.2,3
Processor Key Strengths Key Weaknesses Best For
CPU Flexible, broadly compatible Limited parallelism; slow for LLMs General tasks
GPU Parallel matrix operations; training support Inefficient sequential NLP inference Broad AI workloads
LPU Sequential NLP optimisation; fast inference; efficient memory Emerging; limited beyond language tasks LLM inference

6

Architectural Features

LPUs typically employ a Tensor Streaming Processor (TSP) architecture, featuring software-controlled data pipelines that stream instructions and operands like an assembly line.1,3,7 Notable components include:

  • Local Memory Unit (LMU): Multi-bank register file for high-bandwidth scalar-vector access.2
  • Custom Instruction Set Architecture (ISA): Covers memory access (MEM), compute (COMP), networking (NET), and control instructions, with out-of-order execution for latency reduction.2
  • Expandable synchronisation links: Hide data sync overhead in distributed setups, yielding up to 1.75× speedup when doubling devices.2
  • No external memory like HBM; relies on on-chip SRAM (e.g., 230MB per chip) and massive core integration for billion-parameter models.2

Proprietary implementations, such as those in inference engines, maximise bandwidth utilisation (up to 90%) for high-speed text generation.1,2,3

Best Related Strategy Theorist: Jonathan Ross

The foremost theorist linked to the LPU is Jonathan Ross, founder and CEO of Groq, the pioneering company that invented and commercialised the LPU as a new processor category in 2016.1,3,4 Ross’s strategic vision reframed AI hardware strategy around deterministic, assembly-line architectures tailored to LLM inference bottlenecks—compute density and memory bandwidth—shifting from GPU dominance to purpose-built sequential processing.3,5,7

Biography and Relationship to LPU

Born in the United States, Ross earned a PhD in Applied Physics from Stanford University, where he specialised in machine learning acceleration and novel compute architectures. Early in his career, he co-founded Google Brain (now part of Google DeepMind) in 2011, leading hardware innovations like the Google Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)—the first ASIC for ML inference, which influenced hyperscale AI by prioritising efficiency over versatility.[3 implied via Groq context]

In 2016, Ross left Google to establish Groq (initially named Rebellious Computing, rebranded in 2017), driven by the insight that GPUs were suboptimal for the emerging era of LLMs requiring ultra-low-latency inference.3,7 He strategically positioned the LPU as a “new class of processor,” introducing the TSP in 2023 via GroqCloud™, which powers real-time AI applications at speeds unattainable by GPUs.1,3 Ross’s backstory reflects a theorist-practitioner approach: his TPU experience exposed GPU limitations in sequential workloads, leading to LPU’s conveyor-belt determinism and scalability—core to Groq’s market disruption, including partnerships for embedded AI.2,3 Under his leadership, Groq raised over $1 billion in funding by 2025, validating LPU as a strategic pivot in AI infrastructure.3,4 Ross continues to advocate LPU’s role in democratising fast, cost-effective inference, authoring key publications and demos that benchmark its superiority.3,7

References

1. https://datanorth.ai/blog/gpu-lpu-npu-architectures

2. https://arxiv.org/html/2408.07326v1

3. https://groq.com/blog/the-groq-lpu-explained

4. https://www.purestorage.com/knowledge/what-is-lpu.html

5. https://www.turingpost.com/p/fod41

6. https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/nlp/what-are-language-processing-units-lpus/

7. https://blog.codingconfessions.com/p/groq-lpu-design

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Quote: Marc Wilson – Global Advisors

Quote: Marc Wilson – Global Advisors

“Parents want to know what their kids should study in the age of AI – curiosity, agency, ability to learn and adapt, diligence, resilience, accountability, trust, ethics and teamwork define winners in the age of AI more than knowledge.” – Marc Wilson – Global Advisors

Over the last few years, I have spent thousands of hours inside AI systems – not as a spectator, but as someone trying to make them do real work. Not toy demos. Not slideware. I’m talking about actual consulting workflows: research, synthesis, modeling, data extraction, and client delivery.

What that experience strips away is the illusion that the future belongs to people who simply “know how to use AI.”

Every week there is a new tool, a new model, a new framework. What looked like a hard-won advantage six months ago is now either automated or irrelevant. Prompt engineering and tool-specific workflows are being collapsed into the models themselves. These are transitory skills. They matter in the moment, but they do not compound.

What does compound is agency.

Agency is the ability to look at a messy, underspecified problem and decide it will not beat you. It is the instinct to decompose a system, to experiment, and to push past failure when there is no clear map. AI does not remove the need for that; it amplifies it. The people who get the most from these systems are not the ones who know the “right” prompts – they are the ones who iterate until the system produces the required outcome.

In practice, that looks different from what most people imagine. The most effective practitioners don’t ask, “What prompt should I use?”

They ask, “How do I get this result?”

They iterate. They swap tools. They reframe the problem. They are not embarrassed by trial-and-error or a hallucination because they aren’t outsourcing responsibility to the machine. They own the output.

Parents ask what their children should study for the “age of AI.” The question is understandable, but it misses the mark. Knowledge has never been more abundant. The marginal value of knowing one more thing is collapsing. What is becoming scarce is the ability to turn knowledge into action.

That is the core of agency:

  • Curiosity to explore and continuously learn and adapt.

  • Diligence is care about the details.

  • Resilience in the face of failures and constant change.

  • Accountability to own the outcome.

  • Ethics that focus on humanity.

  • People who form trusted relationships.

These qualities are not “soft.” They are decisive.

Machines can write, code and reason at superhuman speed – the differentiator is not who has the most information – it is who takes responsibility for the outcome.

AI will reward the people who show up, take ownership and find a way through uncertainty. Everything else – including today’s fashionable technical skills – will be rewritten.

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