“We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn’t mourn it; nostalgia is not a strategy. But we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, and more just.” – Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada
Mark Carney’s address at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 20 January 2026 articulated a philosophical pivot that extends far beyond Canadian policy. His assertion that “the old order is not coming back” represents a candid acknowledgement of the structural transformation reshaping international relations-a transformation that demands not nostalgic resistance but strategic innovation. The quote encapsulates a broader intellectual movement among contemporary policymakers who recognise that the post-Cold War consensus, built on rules-based multilateralism and assumed Western dominance, has fundamentally fractured.
The Context of Carney’s Intervention
Carney delivered this address as Canada’s 24th Prime Minister, having assumed office in March 2025 following his election as Liberal Party leader with an unprecedented 85.9% of the vote on the first ballot. His ascension marked a significant departure in Canadian political history: he became the first Canadian Prime Minister never to have held elected office before assuming the premiership. This unconventional trajectory-from central banking to the highest political office-reflects the technocratic orientation increasingly evident in responses to complex geopolitical challenges.
The timing of Carney’s Davos intervention proved strategically significant. His address came mere days after a high-profile visit to Beijing, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and negotiated a “new strategic partnership” that substantially reduced tariffs on Canadian canola oil (from 85% to 15%) and Chinese electric vehicles (from 100% to 6.1%). This diplomatic manoeuvre exemplified the very philosophy he articulated at Davos: rather than lamenting the erosion of Western-led institutional frameworks, Canada was actively recalibrating its relationships to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities.
The Intellectual Architecture: Value-Based Realism
Carney’s formulation draws explicitly on what he termed “value-based realism,” a concept articulated by Alexander Stubb, President of Finland. This framework represents a deliberate synthesis of two traditionally opposed analytical traditions: the idealist commitment to universal values (human rights, sovereignty, democratic governance) and the realist acknowledgement of power dynamics and national interest. Rather than treating these as contradictory, value-based realism posits that nations can maintain principled commitments whilst simultaneously engaging pragmatically with the world as it exists rather than as they wish it to be.
This intellectual positioning reflects broader currents in contemporary international relations theory. The concept challenges what scholars term “liberal internationalism”-the post-1945 consensus that institutionalised rules, multilateral organisations, and shared norms could transcend power politics. Carney’s acknowledgement that “the old comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security” no longer hold valid represents a significant concession to structural realist arguments that have long emphasised the primacy of material capabilities and strategic positioning over institutional arrangements.
Leading Theorists and Intellectual Foundations
Structural Realism and the Multipolar Transition: Carney’s analysis aligns substantially with structural realist scholarship, particularly the work of scholars examining the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Theorists such as John Mearsheimer have long argued that the post-Cold War unipolar moment was inherently unstable and that the rise of peer competitors (particularly China) would inevitably erode the institutional frameworks built during American hegemony. Carney’s acknowledgement that “the powerful have their power” whilst Canada must “build our strength at home” reflects this realist recognition that material capabilities ultimately determine strategic options.
Strategic Autonomy and Middle Power Theory: Carney explicitly positioned Canada as a “middle power” capable of exercising disproportionate influence through strategic positioning. This concept draws on middle power theory, developed by scholars including Andrew Cooper and Evan Potter, which argues that states occupying the intermediate tier of the international system can leverage their geographic position, institutional expertise, and coalition-building capacity to exercise influence beyond their material weight. Carney’s emphasis on “building strategic autonomy whilst maintaining values” reflects this theoretical framework-middle powers must avoid dependency on great power patrons whilst retaining the principled commitments that differentiate them from purely transactional actors.
The Fracture Metaphor and Institutional Decay: Carney’s use of “fracture” rather than “collapse” or “transformation” carries theoretical significance. This language echoes the work of scholars examining institutional erosion, particularly those studying the decline of post-war multilateral organisations. Theorists including Dani Rodrik have documented how globalisation and geopolitical competition have strained the institutional consensus that underpinned the Bretton Woods system and its successors. The fracture metaphor suggests not apocalyptic breakdown but rather the splintering of previously unified frameworks into competing regional and bilateral arrangements.
Constructivist Approaches to Order-Building: Carney’s assertion that “from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, and more just” reflects constructivist international relations theory, which emphasises that international orders are socially constructed rather than determined by material forces alone. Scholars including Alexander Wendt have argued that actors can reshape international structures through strategic communication and norm entrepreneurship. Carney’s framing positions Canada not as a passive victim of systemic change but as an active participant in constructing new institutional arrangements-a distinctly constructivist orientation.
The Rejection of Nostalgia as Strategic Doctrine
Carney’s explicit rejection of nostalgia as a strategic framework warrants particular attention. This formulation directly challenges what scholars term “nostalgic nationalism”-the tendency of declining powers to seek restoration of previous hierarchies rather than adaptation to new circumstances. The statement “nostalgia is not a strategy” functions as both intellectual critique and practical warning. It implicitly critiques both American efforts to reassert unilateral dominance and European attempts to preserve Cold War alliance structures unchanged.
This positioning reflects contemporary debates within strategic studies about how established powers should respond to relative decline. Scholars including Hal Brands have examined whether declining powers typically pursue accommodation or confrontation; Carney’s framework suggests a third path: strategic recalibration that preserves core values whilst abandoning outdated institutional assumptions.
Domestic Foundations: Building Strength at Home
Carney’s emphasis on building “strength at home” through tax reductions, removal of interprovincial trade barriers, and a trillion-dollar investment programme in energy, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals reflects economic nationalism tempered by liberal institutional commitments. This approach synthesises elements of developmental state theory (the strategic deployment of state capacity to build competitive advantage) with market-liberal principles. The doubling of defence spending by decade’s end, coupled with investments in domestic industrial capacity, reflects what scholars term “strategic decoupling”-the deliberate reduction of dependency on potentially unreliable partners through domestic capability development.
This domestic orientation also reflects recognition of what political economists call the “trilemma of globalisation”: the impossibility of simultaneously maintaining democratic sovereignty, deep economic integration, and fixed exchange rates. By prioritising sovereignty and strategic autonomy, Carney’s government implicitly accepts reduced integration with some partners whilst deepening selective relationships (notably with China) where mutual benefit is demonstrable.
The Broader Geopolitical Significance
Carney’s Davos address arrived at a moment of acute geopolitical tension. The ongoing trade conflict with the United States, the continuation of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the intensifying competition for technological and resource dominance between Western and Chinese-led blocs have created what scholars term a “multiplex world order”-one characterised by simultaneous cooperation and competition across multiple domains rather than simple bipolarity or unipolarity.
His reception-described as earning “a rare standing ovation” at Davos-suggests that his articulation of value-based realism resonated with an international audience of business and political leaders grappling with similar strategic dilemmas. The framework offers intellectual legitimacy for the pragmatic recalibration that many middle and smaller powers have already undertaken, whilst maintaining rhetorical commitment to universal principles.
Implications for International Order-Building
Carney’s vision of building “something bigger, better, stronger, and more just” from the fracture of the old order represents an optimistic but contingent proposition. It assumes that the emerging multipolar system need not replicate the zero-sum competition that characterised earlier multipolar eras, and that institutional innovation can accommodate both great power competition and cooperative problem-solving on transnational challenges.
This optimism reflects what scholars call “liberal institutionalism”-the belief that even in anarchic international systems, institutions can facilitate cooperation and reduce transaction costs. Yet Carney’s framework differs from earlier liberal institutionalism in its explicit acknowledgement that such institutions must reflect contemporary power distributions rather than attempting to preserve outdated hierarchies. The Canada-China strategic partnership, with its focus on trade, energy, and technology, exemplifies this approach: cooperation structured around mutual benefit rather than ideological alignment or institutional obligation.
The intellectual coherence of Carney’s position lies in its rejection of false dichotomies. It refuses the choice between principled commitment and pragmatic engagement, between national interest and international cooperation, between acknowledging systemic change and working to shape its trajectory. Whether this framework can sustain itself amid intensifying great power competition remains an open question-one that will substantially determine the character of the emerging international order.
References
2. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/about
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Carney
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miM4ur5WH3Y
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qIUrFANCvU
7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QBT5fR-DY
