ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

“It seems that every day we’re reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules-based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can and the weak must suffer what they must.” – Mark Carney – Prime Minister of Canada

Mark Carney’s invocation of Thucydides at the World Economic Forum represents far more than rhetorical flourish-it signals a fundamental recalibration of how middle powers must navigate an era of renewed great power competition. Delivered at Davos on 20 January 2026, the Canadian Prime Minister’s address articulates a doctrine of “value-based realism” that acknowledges the erosion of the post-Cold War international architecture whilst refusing to accept the fatalism such erosion might imply.

The Context: A World in Transition

Carney’s speech arrives at a pivotal moment in international affairs. The rules-based order that underpinned global stability since 1945-and particularly since the Cold War’s conclusion-faces unprecedented strain from great power rivalry, economic fragmentation, and the weaponisation of interdependence. The Canadian Prime Minister’s diagnosis is unflinching: the comfortable assumptions that geography and alliance membership automatically confer prosperity and security are no longer valid.¹ This is not mere academic observation; it reflects lived experience across the Western alliance as traditional frameworks prove inadequate to contemporary challenges.

The quote itself draws directly from Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue, wherein the Athenian envoys declare that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” By invoking this ancient formulation, Carney grounds contemporary geopolitical anxiety in historical precedent, suggesting that the current moment represents not an aberration but a return to a more primal logic of international relations-one temporarily obscured by the post-1989 liberal consensus.

The Intellectual Foundations: Realism and Its Evolution

Carney’s framework draws upon several strands of international relations theory, most notably classical realism and its contemporary variants. The concept of “value-based realism,” which Carney attributes to Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, represents an attempt to synthesise realist analysis of power distribution with liberal commitments to human rights, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.¹ This is a deliberate intellectual move-rejecting both naive multilateralism and amoral power politics in favour of a pragmatic middle path.

Classical realism, articulated most influentially by Hans Morgenthau in the mid-twentieth century, posits that states are rational actors pursuing power within an anarchic international system. Morgenthau’s seminal work Politics Among Nations established that national interest, defined in terms of power, constitutes the objective of statecraft. Yet Morgenthau himself recognised that power encompasses more than military capacity-it includes economic strength, technological capability, and moral authority. Carney’s approach resurrects this more nuanced understanding, arguing that middle powers possess distinct forms of leverage beyond military might.

The realist tradition has evolved considerably since Morgenthau. Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism emphasised the anarchic nature of the international system and the security dilemma it generates, wherein defensive measures by one state appear threatening to others, creating spirals of mistrust. This framework helps explain contemporary great power competition: as American hegemony faces challenge from rising powers, each actor rationally pursues security through military buildups and alliance formation, inadvertently triggering the very insecurity it seeks to prevent. Carney’s diagnosis aligns with this logic-the “end of the rules-based order” reflects not malice but the structural pressures inherent in multipolarity.

More recent theorists have grappled with how middle powers navigate such environments. Scholars such as Andrew Pratt and Fen Osler Hampton have examined “middle power diplomacy,” arguing that states lacking superpower status can exercise disproportionate influence through coalition-building, norm entrepreneurship, and strategic positioning. This intellectual tradition directly informs Carney’s prescription: middle powers must act together, creating what he terms “a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture” upon which they can draw for future challenges.¹

The Diagnosis: Structural Transformation

Carney’s analysis identifies three interconnected phenomena reshaping the international landscape. First, the erosion of the rules-based order reflects genuine shifts in material power distribution. The post-Cold War moment, characterised by American unipolarity and the apparent triumph of liberal democracy, has given way to multipolarity and ideological contestation. Great powers-whether the United States, China, or Russia-increasingly view international institutions and agreements as constraints on their freedom of action rather than frameworks for mutual benefit.

Second, economic interdependence, once theorised as a force for peace, has become weaponised. Sanctions regimes, technology restrictions, and supply chain manipulation now constitute standard instruments of statecraft. This transformation reflects what scholars term the “securitisation” of economics-the process whereby economic relationships become framed through security logics. Carney explicitly warns against this: middle powers must resist the temptation to accept “economic intimidation” from one direction whilst remaining silent about it from another, lest they signal weakness and invite further coercion.¹

Third, the traditional alliance structures that provided security guarantees to middle powers have become less reliable. NATO’s continued existence notwithstanding, the United States under various administrations has questioned its commitment to collective defence, whilst simultaneously pursuing unilateral policies (such as tariff regimes) that undermine allied interests. This creates what Carney identifies as a fundamental strategic problem: bilateral negotiation between a middle power and a hegemon occurs from a position of weakness, forcing accommodation and competitive deference.¹

The Intellectual Lineage: From Thucydides to Contemporary Geopolitics

Carney’s invocation of Thucydides connects to a broader contemporary discourse on great power competition. Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” thesis-the proposition that conflict between a rising power and a declining hegemon is structurally likely-has become influential in policy circles. Allison argues that of sixteen historical cases where a rising power challenged a ruling one, twelve ended in war. This framework, whilst contested by scholars who emphasise contingency and agency, captures genuine anxieties about Sino-American relations and broader multipolarity.

Yet Carney’s deployment of Thucydides differs subtly from Allison’s. Rather than accepting the Trap as inevitable, Carney uses the ancient formulation to establish a baseline-the world as it actually is, stripped of comforting illusions-from which alternative paths become possible. This reflects what might be termed “tragic realism”: an acknowledgment of structural constraints coupled with insistence on human agency and moral choice.

Contemporary theorists of middle power strategy have developed frameworks relevant to Carney’s prescription. Scholars such as Amitav Acharya have examined how middle powers can exercise “agency” within structural constraints through what he terms “norm localisation”-adapting global norms to regional contexts and thereby shaping international discourse. Similarly, theorists of “minilateral” cooperation-agreements among smaller groups of like-minded states-provide intellectual scaffolding for Carney’s vision of issue-specific coalitions rather than universal institutions.

The Prescription: Strategic Autonomy and Collective Action

Carney’s response to this diagnosis comprises several elements. First, building domestic strength: Canada is cutting taxes, removing interprovincial trade barriers, investing a trillion dollars in energy, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals, and doubling defence spending by decade’s end.¹ This reflects a classical realist insight-that international influence ultimately rests upon domestic capacity. A state cannot punch above its weight indefinitely; sustainable influence requires genuine economic and military capability.

Second, strategic autonomy: rather than accepting subordination to any hegemon, middle powers must calibrate relationships so their depth reflects shared values.¹ This requires what Carney terms “honesty about the world as it is”-recognising that some relationships will be transactional, others deeper, depending on alignment of interests and values. It also requires consistency: applying the same standards to allies and rivals, thereby avoiding the appearance of weakness or double standards that invites further coercion.

Third, coalition-building: Carney proposes plurilateral arrangements-bridging the Trans-Pacific Partnership and European Union to create a trading bloc of 1.5 billion people, forming buyers’ clubs for critical minerals anchored in the G7, cooperating with democracies on artificial intelligence governance.¹ These initiatives reflect what might be termed “competitive multilateralism”-creating alternative institutional frameworks that function as described, rather than relying on existing institutions that have become gridlocked or captured by great powers.

This approach draws upon theoretical work on institutional design and coalition formation. Scholars such as Barbara Koremenos have examined how states choose institutional forms-examining when they prefer bilateral arrangements, multilateral institutions, or minilateral coalitions. Carney’s framework suggests that in an era of great power rivalry, minilateral coalitions organised around specific issues prove more effective than universal institutions, precisely because they exclude actors whose interests diverge fundamentally.

The Philosophical Underpinning: Beyond Nostalgia

Carney’s most provocative claim may be his insistence that “nostalgia is not a strategy.”¹ This rejects a tempting response to the erosion of the post-Cold War order: attempting to restore it through diplomatic pressure or institutional reform. Instead, Carney argues, middle powers must accept that “the old order is not coming back” and focus on building “something bigger, better, stronger, more just” from the fracture.¹

This reflects a philosophical stance sometimes termed “constructive realism”-accepting structural constraints whilst refusing to accept that they determine outcomes. It echoes the existentialist insight that humans are “condemned to be free,” forced to choose even within constraining circumstances. For middle powers, this means accepting that great power rivalry is real and structural, yet refusing to accept that this reality precludes agency, moral choice, or the possibility of building alternative arrangements.

The intellectual roots of this position extend to theorists of social construction in international relations, particularly Alexander Wendt’s argument that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Whilst the anarchic structure of the international system is given, the meaning states attribute to it-whether it necessitates conflict or permits cooperation-remains contestable. Carney’s vision assumes that middle powers, acting together, can construct a different meaning of multipolarity: not a return to Hobbesian warfare but a framework of genuine cooperation among states that share sufficient common ground.

Contemporary Relevance: The Middle Power Moment

Carney’s address arrives at a moment when middle power agency has become increasingly salient. The traditional Cold War binary-alignment with either superpower-has dissolved, creating space for states to pursue more autonomous strategies. Countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and the European Union member states increasingly resist pressure to choose sides in great power competition, instead pursuing what scholars term “strategic autonomy” or “non-alignment 2.0.”

Yet Carney’s formulation differs from classical non-alignment. Rather than attempting to remain neutral between competing blocs, he proposes active coalition-building among states that share values-democracy, human rights, rule of law-whilst remaining pragmatic about interests. This reflects what might be termed “values-based coalition-building,” distinguishing it both from amoral realpolitik and from idealistic universalism.

The stakes Carney identifies are genuine. In a world of great power fortresses-blocs organised around competing powers with limited cross-bloc exchange-middle powers face subordination or marginalisation. Conversely, in a world of genuine cooperation among willing partners, middle powers can exercise disproportionate influence through coalition-building and norm entrepreneurship. Carney’s challenge to middle powers is thus existential: act together or accept subordination.

This framing resonates with contemporary scholarship on the future of international order. Scholars such as Hal Brands and Michael Beckley have examined whether the liberal international order can be reformed or whether it will fragment into competing blocs. Carney’s implicit answer is that the outcome remains undetermined-it depends on choices made by middle powers in the coming years. This is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but genuinely open-ended, contingent upon agency.

The Broader Implications

Carney’s Davos address represents more than Canadian foreign policy positioning. It articulates a vision of international order that acknowledges structural realities-great power rivalry, the erosion of universal institutions, the weaponisation of economic interdependence-whilst refusing to accept that these realities preclude alternatives to hegemonic subordination or great power conflict. For middle powers, this vision offers both diagnosis and prescription: the world has changed fundamentally, but middle powers retain agency if they act together with strategic clarity and moral consistency.

The intellectual traditions informing this vision-classical and structural realism, middle power diplomacy theory, constructivist international relations scholarship-converge on a common insight: international order is not simply imposed by the powerful but constructed through the choices and actions of all states. In an era of multipolarity and great power rivalry, this construction becomes more difficult but also more consequential. The question Carney poses to middle powers is whether they will accept the role assigned to them by great power competition or whether they will actively construct an alternative.