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Global Advisors’ Thoughts: Business success. Get real.
By Marc Wilson
We all want success. And as we embark on a career, most of us want to be successful. But when I probe aspirations, “being successful” is usually a proxy for “I want the rewards / power /status of success.”
If you think that business success has different rules to success in sports, less reliance on discipline, more reliance on connections and things out of your control, reconsider or stop reading.
If your job is a ticket to a pay-cheque, is so-many-hours-per-day, stop reading.
Brutally, most of us will not be successful. We will not achieve stand-out performance. We will under-achieve our childish dreams. Choose:
- Continue to fantasize OR
- Get real and set your targets lower OR
- Confront the challenge and do what it takes to chase your dream.
Dreaming is important. It is the often the reason that we try at all. But the great achievers realise that a dream without a plan and action remains a fantasy.
“…in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things.” — U.S. President Barack Obama
Obama was quoting “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.”
When I was younger and starting out, I think I marked a lot of my desires for success in positions or promotions I hoped to achieve. In the first draft of this article, someone remarked that I had not mentioned promotion once. That is quite a stunning reflection. I believe my experience and growing up helped me realise that promotion and position reflect a result of success rather than success in itself.
Many of us do fantasize. As adolescents, we dream of mansions and sports cars, of power and glory, of beautiful spouses and successful children. As we begin our career journey, these dreams inevitably meet reality. We may continue to deny reasons for the gap between dreams and reality, but many reach a realisation at some point that not everybody can be excellent – by definition. And that to be excellent, we need to be doing things better than those in our defined benchmark.
We fantasize for good reason. Life is hard. As we become more experienced, we discover that achieving success typically requires far more from us than we imagined, we are not all exceptional, success is often dependent on the support of others – and people and relationships are not predictable. Life throws curve balls – illness, family needs and financial constraints to name a few.
But if we are to undertake an adult approach to success, it becomes time to replace fantasy with a deliberate approach to achieving our dreams.
What is success? At its simplest, success is achieving a goal. Being successful is therefore achieving goals regularly. But to most of us, being successful is more than this. Being successful in many people’s minds equates to excellence. Excellence – exceeding standard performance, standing-out, being the best. And pointedly, the rewards most desire for being successful equate with those for excellence.
This is an important distinction. The definition of excellence seems to be far more closely aligned with the aspirations of those with the desire to be successful. The measures of excellence are far more objective and demanding than those of success.
We tend to apply different rules to business success. It must be balanced. It must be within its 9-to-5 box. Here is my challenge to you: if you desire super-achiever business status, why would the lessons learnt from Olympian sports success be different to achieving Olympian stand-out performance in business?
Olympic sports success is not balanced. It is not confined to a part of the day. Olympian sports success is obsessive. It is unbalanced. It is single-minded. It requires brutal sacrifice and pain (see the graphic to the left showing the cost and effort required to get into the Olympics – source: Voucherbox). Why would being the best in your business field require anything less?
I think we tend to create an artificial distinction because an Olympic goal might be confined to a target by the age of 30. Thereafter an athlete can retire to a “normal” life. Similarly, an overachieving student might single-mindedly pursue “top-of the-class” performance knowing that the pain and sacrifice will end with the award of a degree. A business career is part of most of our adult lives and sacrifice for that amount of time is untenable for most people. For this reason, careers like investment banking and management consulting tend to have short lifespans before achievers move on to a second phase. I believe that for this reason they tend to attract more employees seeking super-achievement before the “second-phase” – people will accept the discomfort for a short time horizon.
I believe that there are fifteen determinants to achieving business-career excellence.
1. Get real – look outwards
It is impossible for everybody to…. To read more click here.
Strategy Tools
Strategy Tools: Opportunity/vulnerability matrix – “The Bananagram”
Logic suggests that high relative market share (RMS) should translate into higher profitability (unless the firm was not using its potential advantages or pricing to penetrate the market further). This suggests that a “normative curve / band” exists to describe this phenomenon i.e. the expected profitability of the average business segment in a particular industry according to normal expectations conditional on the segment’s relative market share. This normative band is shown in the figure below as the area between the two curves.
The Opportunity / Vulnerability Matrix
The curve is best explained using data / businesses that have been correctly segmented. In practice such data can only be obtained after analysing the organisation and having a good understanding of any relationships. The band used to be shown coloured yellow, hence the chart became known as a “bananagram”.
The implication of the curve is that high relative market share positions, correctly segmented, are valuable segments / businesses. Managers should therefore strive to achieve / participate in these segments / businesses.
Another implication, in some ways obscured focusing primarily on the growth share matrix (especially where “dogs” are concerned), is that it is useful to improve relative market share in a business segment whatever the starting position. The bananagram enables one to calculate a rough estimate of the equilibrium profitability to be expected from any particular position (relative market share). Therefore it is possible to estimate the potential benefit of moving any particular segment position against the cost of doing so – extra marketing spend, product development or lower prices. This allows one to quantitatively assess whether it is worth trying to raise RMS and which segment / business investments give the best return to shareholders.
Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of observations would fall between the two curved lines and it would be unusual for businesses to fall outside this band. There are two possible positions where a business segment can find itself outside of the two curved lines – this is depicted in the figure below.
The Opportunity / Vulnerability Matrix – Example
Business A is earning (for example) 45 per cent return on net capital employed, a good return, but is in a weak relative market share position (say 0,5x, or only half the size of the segment leader). The theory and empirical data from the matrix suggests that the combination of these two positions is at best anomalous, and probably unsustainable. Business A is therefore in the “vulnerability” part of the matrix. The expectation must be that in the medium term, either the business must improve its relative market share position to sustain its profitability (the dotted arrow moving left), or that it will decline in profitability (to about break-even). Why should this happen? Well, the banana indicates that the market leader in this business may well be earning 40 percent or even more ROCE in the segment. What may be happening is that the leader is holding a price umbrella over the market, that is, is pricing unsustainably high, so that even the competitors with weak market share are protected from normal competition (especially where pricing is concerned). What happens if the market leader suddenly cuts prices by 20 percent? They will still earn a good return, but the weaker competitors will not. The leader may opt to provide extra product benefits or services, instead of lowering prices, but the effect would still be a margin cut. It is as well to know that business A is vulnerable. If relative market share cannot be improved, it is sensible to sell it before the profitability declines.
Now let’s look at business B. This is a business in a strong relative market share position – the leader in its segment, five times larger than its nearest rival. It is earning 2 percent ROCE. This is a wonderful business to find. The theory and practical data suggest that such a business should be making 40 percent ROCE, not 2 percent. Nine times out of ten when such businesses are found, it is possible to make them very much more profitable, usually by radical cost reduction (often involving restructure), but sometimes through radical improvement of service and product offering to the customer at a low extra cost to the supplier, but enabling a large price hike to be made. Managements of particular businesses very often become complacent with historical returns and think it is impossible to raise profits in a step function to three, four or five times their current level. The bananagram challenges that thinking for leadership segment positions, and usually the bananagram is proved right. After all, high relative market share implies huge potential advantages; but these must be earned and exploited, as they do not automatically disgorge huge profits.
Source: Koch, R – “Financial Times Guides Strategy” – Fourth edition – Prentice Hall – page 313-316
Fast Facts
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Cable TV has been declining steadily since 2002. Digital Satellite Services increased since 2002 but has seen no growth since 2012. Pay TV subscribers are switching to streaming TV services as broadband adoption grows. Advances in compression technology and 4G have...
Selected News
Quote: Luis Flavio Nunes – Investing.com
“The crash wasn’t caused by manipulation or panic. It revealed something more troubling: Bitcoin had already become the very thing it promised to destroy.” – Luis Flavio Nunes – Investing.com
The recent Bitcoin crashes of 2025 and early 2026 were not random market events driven by panic or coordinated manipulation. Rather, they exposed a fundamental paradox that has quietly developed as Bitcoin matured from a fringe asset into an institutional investment vehicle. What began as a rebellion against centralised financial systems has, through the mechanisms of modern finance, recreated many of the same structural vulnerabilities that plagued traditional markets.
The Institutional Transformation
Bitcoin’s journey from obscurity to mainstream acceptance represents one of the most remarkable financial transformations of the past decade. When Satoshi Nakamoto released the Bitcoin whitepaper in 2008, the explicit goal was to create “a purely peer-to-peer electronic cash system” that would operate without intermediaries or central authorities. The cryptocurrency was designed as a direct response to the 2008 financial crisis, offering an alternative to institutions that had proven themselves untrustworthy stewards of capital.
Yet by 2025, Bitcoin had become something quite different. Institutional investors, corporations, and even governments began treating it as a store of value and portfolio diversifier. This shift accelerated dramatically following the approval of Bitcoin spot exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in major markets, which legitimised cryptocurrency as an institutional asset class. What followed was an influx of capital that transformed Bitcoin from a peer-to-peer system into something resembling a leveraged financial instrument.
The irony is profound: the very institutions that Bitcoin was designed to circumvent became its largest holders and most active traders. Corporate treasury departments, hedge funds, and financial firms accumulated Bitcoin positions worth tens of billions of dollars. But they did so using the same tools that had destabilised traditional markets-leverage, derivatives, and interconnected financial relationships.
The Digital Asset Treasury Paradox
The clearest manifestation of this contradiction emerged through Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCos). These firms, which manage Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies for corporate clients, accumulated approximately $42 billion in positions by late 2025.1 The appeal was straightforward: Bitcoin offered superior returns compared to traditional treasury instruments, and companies could diversify their cash reserves whilst potentially generating alpha.
However, these positions were not held in isolation. Many DATCos financed their Bitcoin purchases through debt arrangements, creating leverage ratios that would have been familiar to any traditional hedge fund manager. When Bitcoin’s price declined sharply in November 2025, falling to $91,500 and erasing most of the year’s gains, these overleveraged positions became underwater.1 The result was a cascade of forced selling that had nothing to do with Bitcoin’s utility or technology-it was pure financial mechanics.
By mid-November 2025, DATCo losses had reached $1.4 billion, representing a 40% decline in their aggregate positions.1 More troublingly, analysts estimated that if even 10-15% of these positions faced forced liquidation due to debt covenants or modified Net Asset Value (mNAV) pressures, it could trigger $4.3 to $6.4 billion in selling pressure over subsequent weeks.1 For context, this represented roughly double the selling pressure from Bitcoin ETF outflows that had dominated market headlines.
Market Structure and Liquidity Collapse
What made this forced selling particularly destructive was the simultaneous collapse in market liquidity. Bitcoin’s order book depth at the 1% price band-a key measure of market resilience-fell from approximately $20 million in early October to just $14 million by mid-November, a 33% decline that never recovered.1 Analysts described this as a “deliberate reduction in market-making commitment,” suggesting that professional market makers had withdrawn support precisely when it was most needed.
This combination of forced selling and vanishing liquidity created a toxic feedback loop. Small selling moves produced disproportionately large price movements. When prices fell sharply, leveraged positions across the entire crypto ecosystem faced liquidation. On January 29, 2026, Bitcoin crashed from above $88,000 to below $85,000 in minutes, triggering $1.68 billion in forced selling across cryptocurrency markets.5 The speed and violence of these moves bore no relationship to any fundamental change in Bitcoin’s technology or adoption-they were purely mechanical consequences of leverage unwinding in illiquid markets.
The Retail Psychology Amplifier
Institutional forced selling might have been manageable if retail investors had provided offsetting demand. Instead, retail psychology amplified the downward pressure. Many retail investors, armed with historical price charts and belief in Bitcoin’s four-year halving cycle, began selling preemptively to avoid what they anticipated would be a 70-80% drawdown similar to previous market cycles.1
This created a self-fulfilling prophecy. Retail investors, convinced that a crash was coming based on historical patterns, exited their positions voluntarily. This removed the “conviction-based spot demand” that might have absorbed institutional forced selling.1 Instead of a market where buyers stepped in during weakness, there was only a queue of sellers waiting for lower prices. The belief in the cycle became the mechanism that perpetuated it.
The psychological dimension was particularly striking. Reddit communities filled with discussions of Bitcoin falling to $30,000 or lower, with investors citing historical precedent rather than fundamental analysis.1 The narrative had shifted from “Bitcoin is digital gold” to “Bitcoin is a leveraged Nasdaq ETF.” When Bitcoin gained only 4% year-to-date whilst gold rose 29%, and when AI stocks like C3.ai dropped 54% and Bitcoin crashed in sympathy, the pretence of Bitcoin as an independent asset class evaporated.1
The Macro Backdrop and Data Vacuum
These structural vulnerabilities were exacerbated by macroeconomic uncertainty. In October 2025, a U.S. government shutdown resulted in missing economic data, leaving the Federal Reserve, as the White House stated, “flying blind at a critical period.”1 Without Consumer Price Index and employment reports, Fed rate-cut expectations collapsed from 67% to 43% probability.1
Bitcoin, with its 0.85 correlation to dollar liquidity, sold off sharply as investors struggled to price risk in a data vacuum.1 This revealed another uncomfortable truth: Bitcoin’s price movements had become increasingly correlated with traditional financial markets and macroeconomic conditions. The asset that was supposed to be uncorrelated with fiat currency systems now moved in lockstep with Fed policy expectations and dollar liquidity conditions.
Theoretical Foundations: Understanding the Contradiction
To understand how Bitcoin arrived at this paradoxical state, it is useful to examine the theoretical frameworks that shaped both cryptocurrency’s design and its subsequent institutional adoption.
Hayek’s Denationalisation of Money
Friedrich Hayek’s 1976 work “Denationalisation of Money” profoundly influenced Bitcoin’s philosophical foundations. Hayek argued that government monopolies on currency creation were inherently inflationary and economically destructive. He proposed that competition between private currencies would discipline monetary policy and prevent the kind of currency debasement that had plagued the 20th century. Bitcoin’s fixed supply of 21 million coins was a direct implementation of Hayekian principles-a currency that could not be debased through monetary expansion because its supply was mathematically constrained.
However, Hayek’s framework assumed that competing currencies would be held and used by individuals making rational economic decisions. He did not anticipate a world in which Bitcoin would be held primarily by leveraged financial institutions using it as a speculative asset rather than a medium of exchange. When Bitcoin became a vehicle for institutional leverage rather than a tool for individual monetary sovereignty, it violated the core assumption of Hayek’s theory.
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis
Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis provides a more prescient framework for understanding Bitcoin’s recent crashes. Minsky argued that capitalist economies are inherently unstable because of the way financial systems evolve. In periods of stability, investors become increasingly confident and willing to take on leverage. This leverage finances investment and consumption, which generates profits that validate the initial optimism. But this very success breeds complacency. Investors begin to underestimate risk, financial institutions relax lending standards, and leverage ratios climb to unsustainable levels.
Eventually, some shock-often minor in itself-triggers a reassessment of risk. Leveraged investors are forced to sell assets to meet margin calls. These sales drive prices down, which triggers further margin calls, creating a cascade of forced selling. Minsky called this the “Minsky Moment,” and it describes precisely what occurred in Bitcoin markets in late 2025 and early 2026.
The tragedy is that Bitcoin’s design was explicitly intended to prevent Minskyan instability. By removing the ability of central banks to expand money supply and by making the currency supply mathematically fixed, Bitcoin was supposed to eliminate the credit cycles that Minsky identified as the source of financial instability. Yet by allowing itself to be financialised through leverage and derivatives, Bitcoin recreated the exact dynamics it was designed to escape.
Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes
Charles Kindleberger’s historical analysis of financial crises identifies a recurring pattern: displacement (a new investment opportunity emerges), euphoria (prices rise as investors become convinced of unlimited upside), financial distress (early investors begin to exit), and finally panic (a rush for the exits as leverage unwinds). Bitcoin’s trajectory from 2020 to 2026 followed this pattern almost precisely.
The displacement occurred with the approval of Bitcoin ETFs and corporate treasury adoption. The euphoria phase saw Bitcoin reach nearly $100,000 as institutions poured capital into the asset. Financial distress emerged when DATCo positions became underwater and forced selling began. The panic phase manifested in the sharp crashes of late 2025 and early 2026, where $1.68 billion in liquidations could occur in minutes.
What Kindleberger’s framework reveals is that these crises are not failures of individual decision-makers but rather inevitable consequences of how financial systems evolve. Once leverage enters the system, instability becomes structural rather than accidental.
The Centralisation of Bitcoin Ownership
Perhaps the most damning aspect of Bitcoin’s institutional transformation is the concentration of ownership. Whilst Bitcoin was designed as a decentralised system where no single entity could control the network, the distribution of Bitcoin wealth has become increasingly concentrated. Large institutional holders, including corporations, hedge funds, and DATCos, now control a substantial portion of all Bitcoin in existence.
This concentration creates a new form of centralisation-not of the protocol itself, but of the economic incentives that drive price discovery. When a small number of large holders face forced selling, their actions dominate price movements. The market becomes less like a peer-to-peer system of millions of independent participants and more like a traditional financial market where large institutions set prices through their trading activity.
The irony is complete: Bitcoin was created to escape the centralised financial system, yet it has become a vehicle through which that same centralised system operates. The institutions that Bitcoin was designed to circumvent are now its largest holders and most influential participants.
What the Crashes Revealed
The crashes of 2025 and early 2026 were not anomalies or temporary setbacks. They were revelations of structural truths about how Bitcoin had evolved. The asset had retained the volatility and speculative characteristics of an emerging technology whilst acquiring the leverage and interconnectedness of traditional financial markets. It had none of the stability of fiat currency systems (which are backed by government power and tax revenue) and none of the decentralisation of its original design (which had been compromised by institutional concentration).
Bitcoin had become, in the words attributed to Luis Flavio Nunes, “the very thing it promised to destroy.” It had recreated the leverage-driven instability of traditional finance, the concentration of economic power in large institutions, and the vulnerability to forced selling that characterises modern financial markets. The only difference was that these dynamics operated at higher speeds and with greater violence due to the 24/7 nature of cryptocurrency markets and the absence of circuit breakers or trading halts.
The question that emerged from these crashes was whether Bitcoin could evolve beyond this contradictory state. Could it return to its original purpose as a peer-to-peer currency system? Could it shed its role as a leveraged speculative asset? Or would it remain trapped in this paradoxical identity-a decentralised system controlled by centralised institutions, a hedge against financial instability that had become a vehicle for financial instability?
These questions remain unresolved as of early 2026, but the crashes have made clear that Bitcoin’s identity crisis is not merely philosophical. It has material consequences for millions of investors and reveals uncomfortable truths about how financial innovation can be absorbed and repurposed by the very systems it was designed to challenge.
References
3. https://ca.investing.com/members/contributors/272097941/opinion/2
6. https://www.investing.com/members/contributors/272097941/opinion
7. https://www.investing.com/members/contributors/272097941
8. https://www.investing.com/analysis/cryptocurrency
10. https://www.investing.com/crypto/bitcoin/bitcoin-futures
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